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Quick Decisions in Patent Cases
PAUL R. GUGLIUZZA*
Patent litigation is notoriously expensive and time consuming. In the past
decade, however, patent law has changed in many ways that expedite resolution
of infringement disputes. This Article identiﬁes and evaluates this trend toward
quick decisions in patent cases. Balancing the savings in litigation costs against
the potential for error, the Article defends many recent and controversial
developments, including the Supreme Court’s invigoration of the patent eligible
subject matter requirement, the new administrative proceedings created by the
America Invents Act, and changes in the requirements for pleading patent
infringement. These developments permit defendants to obtain rulings of invalid
ity or noninfringement before discovery begins, which was previously impos
sible. Prediscovery rulings cost relatively little and can discourage low-merit
litigation. But resolving complex questions of validity or infringement on a
thin factual record may increase the risk of error, so the Article suggests
additional reforms to help ensure that quick decisions are also accurate
decisions.
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INTRODUCTION
In the past decade, the U.S. patent system has been transformed. Before
Congress passed the America Invents Act (AIA) in 2011, the validity of issued
patents was decided almost exclusively in litigation in the federal courts.
Although the Patent and Trademark Ofﬁce (PTO) offered proceedings to reexam
ine a patent’s validity, those proceedings were not terribly popular, and they
rarely ended in a decision of invalidity.1 Thanks to procedures created by the
AIA, however, the number of ﬁlings at the PTO has doubled in the past few
years, increasing from about a thousand per year as recently as 2010 to about
two thousand per year today.2 Although there are many ways to parse the data,

1. See generally Paul R. Gugliuzza, (In)valid Patents, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 271, 279–85 (2016)
(providing an overview of post-issuance proceedings at the PTO).
2. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, EX PARTE REEXAMINATION FILING DATA 1 (Sept. 30, 2016),
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/documents/ex_parte_historical_stats_roll_up.pdf [https://perma.
cc/5Z7T-XAV9] [hereinafter EX PARTE REEXAMINATION FILING DATA]; U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE,
INTER PARTES REEXAMINATION FILING DATA 1 (Sept. 30, 2016), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/
documents/inter_parte_historical_stats_roll_up.pdf [https://perma.cc/6KSL-K7PY] [hereinafter INTER PAR
TES REEXAMINATION FILING DATA]; U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT TRIAL & APPEAL BD., TRIAL
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the new proceedings are perceived to invalidate patents much more frequently
than those in place before the AIA.3
The Supreme Court has changed patent law, too. Less than a decade ago, the
patentable subject matter requirement of section 101 of the Patent Act was an
afterthought, with the Court having suggested that “anything under the sun that
is made by man” is eligible for patenting.4 In four decisions in the past seven
years, however, the Court has invigorated the eligibility requirement, using it to
invalidate patents on computer software,5 medical diagnostics,6 human gene
sequences,7 and ﬁnancial risk management techniques.8
Other changes in patent law abound. To mention just a few: The Supreme
Court has made it easier to invalidate a patent as obvious9 or indeﬁnite,10
increased courts’ discretion to award attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party,11
and reworked the law of induced infringement.12 Congress adopted several
other reforms in the AIA, including changing the rules for determining priority
among competing patent applicants13 and limiting patentees’ ability to join
multiple defendants in a single lawsuit.14 In addition, amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have heightened the pleading requirements in
patent infringement cases.15 Finally, for the past decade, patent litigation had
been increasingly centralizing in a small number of judicial districts, most
notably in the Eastern District of Texas,16 although a recent Supreme Court
decision will likely reduce the concentration of cases by limiting plaintiffs’
STATISTICS: IPR, PGR, CBM 5 (Sept. 2017), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/documents/Trial_
Stats_2017-09-30.pdf [https://perma.cc/NY75-5P56] [hereinafter PTAB TRIAL STATISTICS].
3. For a detailed discussion of invalidity rates in both the new and old proceedings, see infra Section
I.B.
4. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
5. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
6. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012).
7. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
8. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010).
9. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleﬂex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
10. Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120 (2014).
11. Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014); Highmark Inc. v.
Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744 (2014).
12. See Timothy R. Holbrook, The Supreme Court’s Quiet Revolution in Induced Patent Infringement, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1007, 1025 (2016) (concluding that “[t]he net impact of” four recent
decisions on induced infringement “generally favors patent holders, making it easier for them to
demonstrate liability”). For an analysis questioning whether the Supreme Court’s recent changes to
patent doctrine have signiﬁcantly affected lower courts’ decision making and the behavior of partici
pants in the patent system, see generally Paul R. Gugliuzza, How Much Has the Supreme Court
Changed Patent Law?, 16 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 330 (2017).
13. America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3(b), 125 Stat. 284, 285–86 (2011).
14. Id. § 19(d)(1), 125 Stat. at 332–33.
15. See COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S.,
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 28 (Apr. 29, 2015), http://www.
supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/frcv15(update)_1823.pdf [https://perma.cc/CL84-M7TC]; see also
infra Section III.A.3 (discussing these amendments in more detail).
16. Brian Howard, 2015 End-of-Year Trends, LEX MACHINA (Jan. 7, 2016), https://lexmachina.com/lex
machina-2015-end-of-year-trends [https://perma.cc/DN75-F7SP].
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venue options in infringement suits.17
These changes have been controversial. The former chief judge of the Federal
Circuit famously complained that the Patent and Trial Appeal Board (PTAB)
judges conducting the new AIA proceedings are “acting as death squads, killing
[patent] rights.”18 Many observers, including a past director of the PTO and
another former chief judge of the Federal Circuit, have asserted that the
eligibility requirement is threatening innovation by curbing the availability of
patents.19 Inﬂuential interest groups have begun to lobby Congress to amend the
Patent Act to weaken the eligibility requirement.20 And, as this Article went to
press, the Supreme Court was considering a case that could declare the AIA’s
regime of administrative patent review to be unconstitutional,21 which would be
a victory for those who perceive patent rights to be under assault.
It is not only patent applicants and owners who are unhappy with the current
state of the patent system. Companies that are frequently defendants in patent
litigation are deeply concerned about the emergence of “patent trolls”—entities
that make money not by selling products but by enforcing patents.22 Patent
trolls provided a key impetus for the AIA23 and have led ﬁrms frequently
accused of infringement to seek signiﬁcant procedural changes to patent litiga
tion, including heightened pleading requirements, cost-shifting in discovery, and
mandatory awards of attorneys’ fees.24 Those frequent defendants were also
leading voices urging the Supreme Court, in its recent venue decision, to restrict
17. See TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017). See generally
Paul R. Gugliuzza & Megan M. La Belle, The Patently Unexceptional Venue Statute, 66 AM. U. L. REV.
1027 (2017) (providing an overview of patent venue law and the TC Heartland case).
18. Tony Dutra, Rader Regrets CLS Bank Impasse, Comments on Latest Patent Reform Bill, PAT.,
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. DAILY (BNA) (Oct. 29, 2013), http://www.bna.com/rader-regrets-cls-n1717
9879684 [https://perma.cc/EKF7-4GXH]. But see U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, TRANSCRIPT OF
PATENT PUBLIC ADVISORY COMMITTEE MEETING 129 (Aug. 14, 2014), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/
ﬁles/documents/ppac_transcript_20140814.pdf [https://perma.cc/XTV7-7R6Q] (remarks of James Smith,
chief judge of the PTAB: “If we weren’t in part doing some ‘death squadding,’ we wouldn’t be doing
what the statute calls us to do.”); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Giving the Federal Circuit a Run for Its
Money: Challenging Patents in the PTAB, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 235, 251–57 (2015) (refuting the
“death squad” claim and arguing that “many [challenged] claims deserve to die”).
19. Paul R. Michel, The Supreme Court Saps Patent Certainty, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1751,
1752–54 (2014); Ryan Davis, Kappos Calls for Abolition of Section 101 of Patent Act, LAW360 (Apr.
12, 2016), http://www.law360.com/ip/articles/783604 [https://perma.cc/6L5H-GYLG].
20. See Dennis Crouch, AIPLA On Board with Statutory Reform of 101, PATENTLYO (May 16, 2017),
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2017/05/aipla-statutory-reform.html [https://perma.cc/WHK3-H59K] (dis
cussing amendments proposed by the American Intellectual Property Law Association and the Intellec
tual Property Owners Association).
21. Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 639 F. App’x 639 (Fed. Cir. 2016),
cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2239 (2017) (considering whether the AIA’s inter partes review proceeding
violates either Article III or the Seventh Amendment).
22. See Paul R. Gugliuzza, Patent Trolls and Preemption, 101 VA. L. REV. 1579, 1581 (2015).
23. See BRIAN T. YEH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., AN OVERVIEW OF THE “PATENT TROLLS” DEBATE 1 (Apr.
16, 2013), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42668.pdf [https://perma.cc/N2QR-KVHN].
24. For an overview of recent legislative proposals, see Paul R. Gugliuzza, Patent Litigation
Reform: The Courts, Congress, and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 95 B.U. L. REV. 279, 283–87
(2015).
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plaintiffs’ ability to ﬁle suit in the patentee-friendly Eastern District of Texas.25
Countless scholarly articles have examined patent law’s many recent changes
in isolation.26 This Article, by contrast, takes a holistic approach, identifying
many of those changes as part of a trend toward quick decisions in disputes over
patent infringement. The PTO’s new proceedings were, of course, explicitly
designed to have expert decision makers adjudicate patent validity more efﬁ
ciently.27 But other changes that appear to be addressing inﬁrmities in the
substance of patent law also facilitate quick decisions. For example, the Su
preme Court’s eligibility rulings are, on their face, designed to limit patent
rights on basic research tools and longstanding business practices.28 Yet because
lower courts usually treat patent eligibility as a question of law involving no
disputed issues of fact, they are increasingly invalidating patents at early stages
of litigation, including on prediscovery motions to dismiss. Such early validity
decisions are, under prevailing Federal Circuit precedent, not available for other
prerequisites of patentability, such as nonobviousness and adequate disclosure,
which typically involve hotly disputed factual questions.29 Similarly, several
recent modiﬁcations to the law of patent claim construction are ostensibly
designed to narrow the scope of patent claims and provide better notice of their
boundaries.30 But because claim construction is a task for the judge alone, not
the jury, those modiﬁcations make it easier to resolve issues of validity and
infringement on summary judgment, rather than forcing parties to endure the
time and expense of a trial.31 Numerous other changes to both substantive
patent law and the procedural law relevant to patent disputes ﬁt this pattern of
facilitating quick decisions, as explained in more detail below.32

25. See, e.g., Brief for 48 Internet Cos., Retailers, & Ass’ns as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner,
TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017) (No. 16-341).
26. In addition to the sources cited throughout this Article, several journals have dedicated entire
symposia to one development or another. For a small sample, see Bridging the Gap Between the
Federal Courts and the Patent and Trademark Ofﬁce, 23 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 284, 284–455 (2017);
Cracking the Code: Ongoing § 101 Patentability Concerns in Biotechnology and Computer Software,
82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1751, 1751–1906 (2014); Patent Trial and Appeal Board Proceedings, 24 TEX.
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 301, 301–429 (2017); Who Owns the Controlling Stake in Patent Law?, 66 AM. U. L.
REV. 1015, 1015–1092 (2017).
27. See H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, at 40 (2011) (noting that the AIA “is designed to establish a more
efﬁcient and streamlined patent system that will improve patent quality and limit unnecessary and
counterproductive litigation costs”).
28. See, e.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014) (“We have ‘repeatedly
emphasized [the] . . . concern that patent law not inhibit further discovery by improperly tying up the
future use of’ . . . building blocks of human ingenuity.” (second alteration in original) (quoting Mayo
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 89 (2012))).
29. See infra Section III.A.2.
30. See, e.g., Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2124 (2014) (making it
easier to prove a patent claim invalid as indeﬁnite); Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339,
1349 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc) (adopting a rule of claim construction that subjects more patents to a
provision of the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 112(f), that narrows claim scope).
31. See infra Section III.B.1.
32. See infra Part III.
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Understanding patent law’s ongoing evolution as increasing speed to decision
has several payoffs. Most obviously, it highlights how recent developments
have the potential to decrease the costs of patent litigation by ending cases more
quickly. Reduced litigation costs can, in turn, help remedy free-rider problems
by encouraging more challenges to patent validity.33 Moreover, several of the
new mechanisms of quick decisions provide routes to resolve patent disputes
before discovery, which is when litigation costs begin to escalate signiﬁcantly34
and which is something patent law has never previously had. Lastly, swift
dismissals of unmeritorious claims can incentivize greater ex ante respect for
valid patents, making patents a stronger incentive for innovation.35
But quick decisions also have downsides. To begin with, they may increase
the risk of error. The eligibility requirement, for instance, allows courts to
decide—often on the pleadings alone—the potentially fact-driven question of
whether a patent contains an “inventive concept” as compared to the prior art.
Also, litigation costs are not always low in cases that end quickly. The new PTO
proceedings, for example, still cost hundreds of thousands of dollars.36 Further,
PTO proceedings often proceed concurrently with litigation in court, resulting
in wasteful procedural maneuvering and duplicative effort.37 Likewise, some
mechanisms that appear to resolve patent disputes expeditiously, such as raised
pleading standards, actually encourage more litigation about matters peripheral
to the merits of the case.38 Finally, and most fundamentally, many of the recent
changes in patent law that facilitate quicker decisions do so by favoring accused
infringers. One might therefore worry that the trend toward quick decisions
decreases the innovation incentives provided by patent rights.
On balance, however, the trend seems to be a positive development. Many
observers have recently expressed alarm about a proliferation of low-quality
patents, that is, patents that provide poor notice of their boundaries, that are not
particularly inventive, or both.39 This concern is particularly acute with regard
to patentees (often referred to pejoratively as patent trolls) who use low-quality
patents and the threat of litigation to extract settlements that appear excessive
because, in many cases, the patentee probably would not have prevailed if the
33. See infra Section I.A.
34. See Greg Reilly, Linking Patent Reform and Civil Litigation Reform, 47 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 179,
199 (2015).
35. See infra Section II.A (discussing in more detail how rules regarding the timing of adjudication
can affect deterrence). See generally Keith N. Hylton, When Should a Case Be Dismissed? The
Economics of Pleading and Summary Judgment Standards, 16 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 39, 41 (2008)
(exploring how early dismissals of low-merit claims “enhance the average quality or merit of lawsuits,
which in turn enhances incentives to comply with the law”).
36. See AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 43 (2017) (reporting
average expenses of $100,000 through the ﬁling of a petition, $275,000 through the end of the PTAB’s
hearing, and $350,000 through appeal).
37. See Peggy P. Ni, Rethinking Finality in the PTAB Age, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 557, 577 (2016).
38. See infra Section III.A.3.
39. See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND
LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK (2008).
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dispute had been litigated to a ﬁnal judgment.40 Although the scope and
existence of the “troll” problem is a matter of vigorous dispute,41 the salient
point is that concerns about trolls highlight several weaknesses of the current
patent system, including the large number of patents issued by the PTO that are
probably invalid and the high cost of patent litigation.42
Still, it is critical that the mechanisms providing speedy decisions avoid
erroneously dismissing meritorious claims and operate at the lowest cost pos
sible. Accordingly, throughout this Article, I highlight various ways in which
the processes of the patent system could be improved to further increase
accuracy and reduce costs. For instance, wasteful concurrent litigation in courts
and at the PTO could be curtailed if both tribunals applied the same principles
of claim construction and standards of proof, which would enable more PTO
rulings to receive preclusive effect in the courts and vice versa.43 Also, courts
might render more accurate decisions on patent eligibility if they recognized the
doctrine’s factual underpinnings and properly applied the motion to dismiss
framework created by the Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly44
and Ashcroft v. Iqbal.45 That framework requires the judge to consider whether
there is a plausible scenario in which the plaintiff could prevail, rather than
simply ruling on the patent’s inventiveness without giving the patentee the
beneﬁt of the doubt on factual questions, which seems to be the prevailing
practice.
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides essential
background on the processes of patent litigation in court and administrative
review at the PTO. Part II sketches a framework, grounded in considerations
about the social cost of litigation, for evaluating the optimal timing of decision
in patent cases.46 It also situates recent changes in patent law within broader

40. See Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113 COLUM. L.
REV. 2117, 2126–28 (2013) (noting that certain trolls, so-called “bottom feeders,” are not particularly
“concerned with the validity and scope of any given patent . . . because they plan to settle before
validity and infringement are determined”).
41. See infra notes 116–20 and accompanying text.
42. See Lauren H. Cohen et al., “Troll” Check? A Proposal for Administrative Review of Patent
Litigation, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1775, 1807 (2017); see also Ted Sichelman, The Vonage Trilogy: A Case
Study in “Patent Bullying,” 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 543, 548–49 (2014) (listing several “serious
defects in the patent system” including the large number of poor-quality patents and the high cost of
invalidating them).
43. See infra Section III.A.1.
44. 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
45. 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009); see infra Section III.A.2.
46. Few scholars have used the cost of patent litigation as a mechanism to explain and critique the
substance of patent law, though this approach has been used in other areas of intellectual property
doctrine. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of
Justiﬁcation, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 241, 278–79 (1998) [hereinafter Bone, Trade Secret Law]; Robert G.
Bone, Enforcement Costs and Trademark Puzzles, 90 VA. L. REV. 2099, 2101 (2004); Douglas
Lichtman, Copyright as a Rule of Evidence, 52 DUKE L.J. 683, 687 (2003); William McGeveran,
Rethinking Trademark Fair Use, 94 IOWA L. REV. 49, 51–52 (2008); William McGeveran, The
Trademark Fair Use Reform Act, 90 B.U. L. REV. 2267, 2280 (2010) [hereinafter McGeveran,
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trends in the law of civil procedure that favor early resolution of litigation. Part
III presents the Article’s novel descriptive claim, conceptualizing numerous
recent changes in patent law as part of a trend toward quick decisions. Drawing
on the theoretical framework outlined in Part II, Part III also offers a prelimi
nary defense of that trend and identiﬁes several ways in which litigation-related
costs could be further reduced and accuracy could be increased. Finally, Part IV
looks to the future, arguing that current trends should not be dismissed as
merely a backlash against the era of strong patent rights that began in the 1980s.
Rather, by thinking critically about how to minimize costs related to enforcing
patents, judges and policymakers can help moderate the often drastic swings in
patent doctrine that occur between pro-patent and anti-patent eras.
I. PATENT ADJUDICATION
This Article focuses on what I call “patent adjudication,” meaning disputes
involving patents that have already been issued by the PTO.47 Patent adjudica
tion takes two basic forms: litigation in court and post-issuance review at the
PTO.48 A primer on those processes, their costs, and their social welfare
implications will aid in understanding the remainder of this Article.
A. LITIGATION IN COURT

Patent infringement lawsuits are the most common type of patent litigation in
court. A patentee may ﬁle an infringement suit against anyone who “makes,
uses, offers to sell, or sells” the patented invention, as well as anyone who
imports the invention into the United States.49 In addition to those theories of
direct infringement, the patentee may assert claims of indirect infringement
against anyone who induces others to infringe the patent or who contributes to
infringement by selling, offering to sell, or importing certain components of a
patented invention.50 In response to an infringement suit, the accused infringer

Trademark Fair Use Reform]. Similarly, although the Supreme Court has rarely mentioned litigation
costs in its recent patent law opinions, see infra note 263, concerns about quick and inexpensive
decisions have sometimes featured in Supreme Court opinions in other areas of intellectual property
law. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 213–14 (2000) (rejecting a
proposed test that would have allowed product design to sometimes be inherently distinctive under, and
therefore automatically protected by, federal trademark law, noting that “[s]uch a test would rarely
provide the basis for summary disposition of an anticompetitive strike suit”).
47. Patent adjudication can be contrasted with pre-issuance examination proceedings.
48. If an infringing product is imported into the United States, the patentee may also seek an
exclusion order from the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC). See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d) (2012).
I discuss ITC proceedings—which also facilitate quick decisions—in more detail below. See infra
Section III.B.4.
49. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2010).
50. Id. § 271(b)–(c). Section 271 contains several other more specialized acts of infringement
involving pharmaceutical products, medical devices, the products of infringing processes, and the
components of infringing products that are assembled abroad. For an overview of the various types of
infringement outlined in section 271, see Timothy R. Holbrook, The Potential Extraterritorial Conse
quences of Akamai, 26 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 499, 502 n.20 (2012).

2018]

QUICK DECISIONS IN PATENT CASES

627

usually asserts both that it does not infringe the patent and that the patent is
invalid.51 Rather than waiting to be sued for infringement, a potential infringer
can instead ﬁle its own lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment of noninfringe
ment, invalidity, or both, provided that the potential infringer satisﬁes a standing
requirement discussed in more detail below.52
Patent litigation can conclude in many different ways, each with unique
implications for social welfare. The vast majority of patent cases settle.53 After
a settlement the patent remains in force, but the accused infringer usually
receives a license to practice the patent. This result saves the parties and the
court system the expense of continued litigation and typically allows the
accused infringer to continue operating in the market, albeit usually subject to a
royalty payment. As a strictly legal matter, however, the settlement binds only
the parties to the case.
Patent litigation can also conclude with a ruling of noninfringement or a
ruling that the patent is not invalid and is infringed. Like a settlement, a ruling
on the issue of infringement does not formally bind those who were not parties
to the case, although the consequences for nonparties going forward can be
signiﬁcant. For instance, a patentee who proves infringement might obtain an
injunction keeping a competitor out of the market, which could allow the
patentee to raise prices. Moreover, some of the court’s interim legal rulings,
such as its rulings on claim construction, can be persuasive or even binding in
future litigation.54 A patentee may not, however, use a ruling that its patent is
not invalid to bind newly accused infringers in future cases because principles
of due process require that those defendants have the opportunity to personally
litigate the invalidity defense.55 That said, the Federal Circuit has indicated that
a prior decision in the patentee’s favor on the issue of validity should be given
“weight” by a subsequent court even if that later litigation is against a different
accused infringer.56

51. An infringer can also argue that a patent is unenforceable for reasons grounded in equity, such as
that the patentee obtained the patent by intentionally deceiving the PTO. See Therasense, Inc. v. Becton,
Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc). Because of the similarity between
invalidity and unenforceability, I refer in the text solely to invalidity.
52. See infra Section III.B.3.
53. See Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, How Are Patent Cases Resolved? An Empirical
Examination of the Adjudication and Settlement of Patent Disputes, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 237, 259
(2006) (“[A]pproximately 80% of patent cases settle.”); see also John R. Allison et. al., Patent Quality
and Settlement Among Repeat Patent Litigants, 99 GEO. L.J. 677, 689 (2011) (reporting a settlement
rate of 90.5% for the “most-litigated patents” and 84% for “once-litigated patents”).
54. See e.Digital Corp. v. Futurewei Techs., Inc., 772 F.3d 723, 726 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (noting that,
under principles of issue preclusion, a nonparty may invoke a favorable claim construction order
against the patentee in subsequent litigation). Even when preclusion does not apply, a prior construction
of the patent’s claims can operate as persuasive authority or, if passed upon by the Federal Circuit,
receive stare decisis effect. See Burke, Inc. v. Bruno Indep. Living Aids, Inc., 183 F.3d 1334, 1337
(Fed. Cir. 1999).
55. See Stevenson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 713 F.2d 705, 710–11 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
56. See Mendenhall v. Cedarapids, Inc., 5 F.3d 1557, 1569–70 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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A ruling of patent invalidity is the outcome of a patent case that can have the
most signiﬁcant impact going forward, both on the parties and on nonparties.
Those consequences stem mainly from the doctrine of issue preclusion and, in
particular, the Supreme Court’s seminal decision in Blonder-Tongue Laborato
ries, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation.57 In that case, the Court aban
doned the so-called mutuality requirement, which prohibited anyone who was
not a party to a prior case from relying upon the judgment, and held that once a
litigant convinces a court to hold a particular patent invalid, any litigant accused
of infringing the same patent in the future may use that invalidity decision as a
complete defense.58 Thus, although a patentee may not use a ruling that its
patent is not invalid offensively in a future case,59 an accused infringer may
defensively use a prior ruling that a patent is invalid.
Though Blonder-Tongue enables nonparties to beneﬁt from rulings of invalid
ity in later litigation,60 the decision also makes it likely that fewer rulings of
invalidity will be produced than is socially optimal.61 Blonder-Tongue turns
invalidity judgments into what economists call a public good, something that,
like the information protected by intellectual property law itself, others cannot
be excluded from using and whose use by one person does not reduce its
availability to others.62 That is, an accused infringer who invalidates a patent
does not internalize all the beneﬁts of the invalidity decision.63 Rather, it shares
those beneﬁts with other potential infringers—quite often its own competitors—
who may use the doctrine of nonmutual defensive issue preclusion to free-ride
on its litigating efforts.64
Several other features of patent litigation, in addition to Blonder-Tongue,
nudge accused infringers away from a defense of invalidity and toward a
57. 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
58. Id. at 320–21, 349–50.
59. See Stevenson, 713 F.2d at 710–11.
60. Cf. Stephen Yelderman, Do Patent Challenges Increase Competition?, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1943,
1961–62, 1993–94 (2016) (noting that, for the invalidation of a patent to increase market competition,
several other conditions must be met).
61. See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 75, 88–90 (2005).
62. See Joseph Scott Miller, Building a Better Bounty: Litigation-Stage Rewards for Defeating
Patents, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 667, 682, 687–88 (2004). One partial exception to the statement that
invalidity judgments are public goods is in pharmaceutical patent litigation under the Hatch–Waxman
Act, which allows a generic company that invalidates a patent to obtain a short period of regulatory
exclusivity. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2012); see also infra note 412 and accompanying text
(discussing Hatch–Waxman exclusivity in more detail). This exclusivity period is speciﬁcally designed
to overcome the public goods problem presented by Blonder-Tongue. See C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for
Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553,
1605 (2006).
63. See Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives to Challenge and Defend Patents: Why
Litigation Won’t Reliably Fix Patent Ofﬁce Errors and Why Administrative Patent Review Might Help,
19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943, 958 (2004).
64. See Megan M. La Belle, Patent Law as Public Law, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 41, 64–93 (2012)
(discussing doctrinal and practical obstacles to patent challenges, in addition to the public goods issue).
For a general discussion of public goods and of ways to solve free-rider problems, see Michael J.
Meurer, Fair Division, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 937, 966–67 (1999) (book review).
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defense of noninfringement. For example, the burden of proving invalidity falls
on the accused infringer, who must carry that burden by clear and convincing
evidence.65 By contrast, it is the patentee’s burden to prove infringement, which
it must prove by a preponderance of the evidence.66 Moreover, an accused
infringer will often have better information about its noninfringement defense
than its invalidity defense.67 The infringement analysis typically turns on the
operation of the defendant’s own product or process, whereas invalidity turns on
information about the state of the art at the time of the invention, which is not as
easy to obtain, at least before the early point in the case at which an infringer is
required to disclose its invalidity contentions.68 Lastly, although nothing prohib
its an accused infringer from trying to argue both invalidity and noninfringe
ment, the claim construction process frequently forces the defendant to choose
to argue for either a narrow construction, which will assist a noninfringement
argument, or a broad construction, which will assist an invalidity argument.
From the patentee’s perspective, Blonder-Tongue encourages settlement rather
than litigation to a ﬁnal judgment because one invalidity ruling permanently
wipes out the patent.69 And, when the patentee decides to ﬁght rather than settle,
it will ﬁght harder, raising the cost of litigation to the parties and to the public
that funds the court system.70 Blonder-Tongue also exacerbates the error costs
of an inaccurate decision of invalidity because the owners of those patents will
not only pay their litigation expenses, “they also lose all future value from their
patents.”71 In short, although Blonder-Tongue gives invalidity judgments more
bite by allowing nonparties to rely on them, the decision’s overall impact on
social welfare is unclear because it increases the costs imposed by the patent
system in several ways.

65. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 95 (2011).
66. Bene v. Jeantet, 129 U.S. 683, 688 (1889).
67. See Roger Allan Ford, Patent Invalidity Versus Noninfringement, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 71, 105
(2013).
68. Invalidity contentions are a ﬁling that most district courts require in patent cases. They typically
must identify each item of prior art that allegedly invalidates the patent, identify the grounds for
invalidity established by each item of prior art, include a chart showing where in each item of prior art
each element of each asserted patent claim is found, and explain any argument of invalidity for
indeﬁniteness or lack of sufﬁcient disclosure. See, e.g., E.D. TEX. PAT. R. 3-3. In many districts,
invalidity contentions are due as few as fourteen days after the patentee discloses which patent claims it
is asserting. See, e.g., N.D. ILL. PAT. R. 2.3; see also N.D. CAL. PAT. R. 3-3 (forty-ﬁve days after
infringement contentions); E.D. TEX. PAT. R. 3-3 (same).
69. See Megan M. La Belle, Against Settlement of (Some) Patent Cases, 67 VAND. L. REV. 375,
398–99 (2014). La Belle also discusses the role federal judges, as part of the more general move
towards “managerial judging,” have played in encouraging settlement of patent litigation. Id. at 388–89,
411–15.
70. Of course, that increase in litigation costs will be somewhat offset by Blonder-Tongue’s
reduction of future litigation, but that reduction will occur only if the initial litigation ends in a ruling of
invalidity. And that ruling of invalidity is less likely precisely because of the incentive to ﬁght harder
that Blonder-Tongue creates.
71. Anup Malani & Jonathan S. Masur, Raising the Stakes in Patent Cases, 101 GEO. L.J. 637, 651
(2013).
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In terms of the parties’ litigation expenses, patent cases can be comparable to
the highest-stakes civil cases.72 According to widely cited numbers compiled by
the American Intellectual Property Law Association, patent litigation pursued
through an appeal costs half a million dollars for even the lowest-stakes case,
and a case in which $25 million or more is at stake can cost upwards of $3
million.73 A large component of the cost of patent litigation—half or more in a
typical case—stems from discovery.74 The relatively high cost of discovery is
often blamed on the “abusive” tactics of patent trolls,75 which has fueled recent
legislative proposals to restrict the scope of discovery and shift discovery costs
to the requesting party.76
B. ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW AT THE PTO

The cost and complexity of patent litigation has long led scholars and
policymakers to suggest that disputes over patent validity might be more
efﬁciently resolved in administrative proceedings at the PTO.77 Congress cre
ated the oldest such proceeding, ex parte reexamination, in 1980.78 In ex parte
reexamination any person, though usually it is someone who has been accused
of or sued for infringement, can ﬁle a petition challenging the validity of a
patent based on other patents or on printed publications in prior art.79 If the
petition raises a “substantial new question of patentability,”80 the PTO institutes
reexamination and the petitioner is excluded from the process from that point
forward.81 Although the PTO grants 92% of petitions to institute ex parte
reexamination, the PTO rarely invalidates the patent.82 Rather, in 66% of
instituted reexaminations, the patentee amends the patent’s claims to preserve
validity.83 The PTO invalidates all of the challenged claims in only 12% of
instituted proceedings.84
To give requesting parties the opportunity to play a more active role in the
administrative review process, Congress created inter partes reexamination in

72. See Reilly, supra note 34, at 199.
73. AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, supra note 36, at 41.
74. Reilly, supra note 34, at 198.
75. Id. at 183.
76. See Gugliuzza, supra note 24, at 285–86.
77. See Mark D. Janis, Rethinking Reexamination: Toward a Viable Administrative Revocation
System for U.S. Patent Law, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 36–38 (1997).
78. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 302–307 (2012).
79. Id. §§ 301–302. The prior art is all the information relevant to a patent’s claim of novelty and
nonobviousness. It includes the patents and printed publications that can provide the basis for ex parte
reexamination (and, as discussed below, inter partes review), as well as prior sales and public uses of
the invention. See id. §§ 102(a), 103.
80. Id. § 303(a).
81. See id. § 305.
82. EX PARTE REEXAMINATION FILING DATA, supra note 2, at 1.
83. Id. at 2.
84. Id.
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1999.85 Inter partes reexamination evolved into inter partes review in the
America Invents Act.86 As explained in more detail below, inter partes review
permits anyone who is not the patent owner to ask the PTO to reconsider
whether the patent satisﬁes the requirements of novelty and nonobviousness.87
Although inter partes reexamination was mostly ignored,88 the new inter partes
review proceeding has been extraordinarily popular, with over four thousand
petitions ﬁled in its ﬁrst four-and-a-half years.89 There are several reasons for
this popularity. First, the proceedings are trial-like. The challenger can make
written submissions and participate in a hearing before the PTAB,90 an entity
created by the AIA and composed of patent lawyers and former patent examin
ers.91 Second, because of tight timelines imposed by the AIA, inter partes
review concludes quickly, usually taking little more than a year.92
The ﬁnal but perhaps most important reason for the popularity of inter partes
review is that challengers have won often. As of March 31, 2017, the PTAB had
held all of the instituted claims unpatentable in 65% of proceedings to reach a
ﬁnal decision (1,029 of 1,577).93 There are, however, many ways to interpret
that statistic. The PTAB declines to institute proceedings about 30% of the time,
and the parties settle roughly one-third of proceedings.94 So, although the PTAB
renders a ruling of invalidity in most of its ﬁnal decisions, less than half of the
patent claims that are initially challenged reach that stage. Of the 70,060 total
claims challenged in inter partes review in the ﬁrst four-and-a-half years of the
proceeding’s existence, only 16,688 (24%) were ruled invalid.95
In inter partes review, similar to ex parte reexamination, the only grounds for
invalidity the challenger may present are anticipation (that is, lack of novelty)
and obviousness, and the only prior art references the challenger may cite are
patents and printed publications.96 But the AIA created two additional PTO

85. Optional Inter Partes Reexamination Procedure Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat.
1501.
86. See America Invents Act, Pub. L. 112-29, § 311, 125 Stat. 284, 299 (2011).
87. See infra Section III.A.1.
88. Among other reasons, the challenger’s right to participate was limited to ﬁling written submis
sions, the proceedings were perceived to be slow, and estoppel provisions required challengers to
essentially choose to litigate validity either in reexamination or litigation in court. See KIMBERLY A.
MOORE ET AL., PATENT LITIGATION AND STRATEGY 1132–33 (4th ed. 2013).
89. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT TRIAL & APPEAL BD., STATISTICS 10 (Mar. 2017),
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/documents/AIA%20Statistics_March2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/
FH28-JRTP] [hereinafter PTAB STATISTICS].
90. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(a) (2012).
91. See id. § 6(a). The PTAB consists of roughly 250 administrative patent judges and hears AIA
post-issuance proceedings in three-judge panels. Although administrative patent judges often have
experience as patent lawyers or examiners, the statute requires only that they “be persons of competent
legal knowledge and scientiﬁc ability.” Id.
92. See infra notes 175–77 and accompanying text.
93. PTAB STATISTICS, supra note 89, at 10.
94. See id.
95. Id. at 12.
96. 35 U.S.C. § 311(b).
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proceedings that allow patentability challenges on any ground and based on any
type of prior art: post-grant review and a temporary program for certain patents
on business methods.97 Post-grant review is available only for patents with
ﬁling dates on or after March 16, 201398 and must be ﬁled within nine months
of patent issuance,99 so only seventy-eight petitions had been ﬁled as of
September 30, 2017.100
The so-called covered business method review proceeding, which is available
for patents that involve a “ﬁnancial product or service,”101 has been more
popular, with 524 petitions ﬁled through September 30, 2017.102 Similar to inter
partes review, the PTAB has held all of the instituted claims unpatentable in
over 80% of proceedings to reach a ﬁnal decision (132 of 162).103 But the same
caveats about that statistic apply because many proceedings settle or end with
an institution-stage decision in favor of the patentee. Of the 8,762 claims
challenged in covered business method review, only 2,357 (27%) have actually
been invalidated.104
The new administrative proceedings created by the AIA are a direct response
to the high cost and long duration of patent litigation. The House Judiciary
Committee report on the AIA explicitly states that the purpose of the new
proceedings is to “provid[e] quick and cost effective alternatives to litiga
tion.”105 Survey evidence indicates that inter partes review pursued through
appeal costs about $350,000106—still expensive, but well below the average
97. See id. §§ 321–329; America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 18, 125 Stat. 284, 329–31
(2011). The business method review proceeding is available only until September 15, 2020. America
Invents Act § 18(a)(3).
98. America Invents Act §§ 3(n)(1), 6(f).
99. 35 U.S.C. § 321(c).
100. See PTAB TRIAL STATISTICS, supra note 2, at 2.
101. America Invents Act § 18(d)(1) (“‘[C]overed business method patent’ means a patent that
claims a method or corresponding apparatus for performing data processing or other operations used in
the practice, administration, or management of a ﬁnancial product or service . . . .”). For examples of
Federal Circuit decisions elaborating on the statutory deﬁnition of patents that qualify for review in this
proceeding, see Unwired Planet, LLC v. Google Inc., 841 F.3d 1376, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (overturning
a PTAB test that classiﬁed a patent as a covered business method patent if it “claim[ed] activities
‘incidental to’ or ‘complementary to’ a ﬁnancial activity”); Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc.,
793 F.3d 1306, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[T]he deﬁnition of ‘covered business method patent’ is not
limited to products and services of only the ﬁnancial industry . . . .”).
102. PTAB TRIAL STATISTICS, supra note 2, at 3. In terms of timing, the only restriction on covered
business method review is that, for patents with ﬁling dates on or after March 16, 2013, the nine-month
window for seeking post-grant review must have expired, or any post-grant review must have
concluded. America Invents Act § 18(a).
103. PTAB STATISTICS, supra note 89, at 11. The statistics reported in this sentence and the remainder
of this paragraph are current through March 31, 2017. In April 2017, the PTO stopped reporting some
of these detailed statistics in favor of a more summary report of AIA trial data. See generally AIA Trial
Statistics, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., https://www.uspto.gov/patents-application-process/appealing
patent-decisions/statistics/aia-trial-statistics [https://perma.cc/28XB-7CVU] (collecting the agency’s sta
tistical reports on AIA proceedings).
104. PTAB STATISTICS, supra note 89, at 13.
105. H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, at 48 (2011).
106. AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, supra note 36, at 38.
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cost of patent litigation in court.107
The House report also justiﬁed the AIA based on the low quality of patents
being issued by the PTO, asserting that an invigorated system of post-issuance
review would “improv[e] patent quality and provid[e] a more efﬁcient system
for challenging patents that should not have issued.”108 The legislative history
frames covered business method review in particular as a response to an
abundance of “poor business-method patents” issued during the late 1990s and
early 2000s that fueled a rise in “patent ‘troll’ lawsuits.”109
II. TIMING PATENT ADJUDICATION
To address concerns about patent trolls exploiting low-quality patents, we
might also think about reforming the examination process to give applications
greater scrutiny so those patents do not issue in the ﬁrst place. But it would
require an unfathomable expansion of PTO resources to more rigorously exam
ine the nearly 500,000 applications the agency receives each year,110 and more
rigorous examination may not be worth the investment given that only a small
fraction of issued patents are ever enforced.111 Patent quality might also be
improved by increasing ﬁling fees at the PTO, which would discourage appli
cants from seeking patents that are valuable only for extracting low-dollar
settlements.112 But applicants will not always know the future value of their
invention at the time of ﬁling, raising the risk that higher fees could deter
innovations that are unexpectedly valuable.
In any case, an entirely ex ante solution to problems with patent quality
seems unlikely. For starters, patent prosecutors are a cohesive lobbying group
with a strong incentive to oppose any legal change that might diminish their
professional opportunities, such as substantial increases in PTO fees.113 More
over, litigators who assert patents—increasingly on a contingency fee basis114—
have a vested interest in ensuring the wide availability of patents. Finally,
regardless of any solutions adopted going forward, questionable patents that
have already been issued will remain in force for a decade or more.115 Thus, as

107. Id. at 37–38.
108. H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, at 39–40.
109. Id. at 54.
110. See John M. Golden, Proliferating Patents and Patent Law’s “Cost Disease,” 51 HOUS. L. REV.
455, 487–89, 491 (2013).
111. See Mark A. Lemley, Essay, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Ofﬁce, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495,
1497 (2001).
112. See David Fagundes & Jonathan S. Masur, Costly Intellectual Property, 65 VAND. L. REV. 677,
679–80 (2012); Jonathan S. Masur, Costly Screens and Patent Examination, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 687,
715 (2010).
113. Masur, supra note 112, at 715 n.52.
114. David L. Schwartz, The Rise of Contingent Fee Representation in Patent Litigation, 64 ALA. L.
REV. 335, 338 (2012).
115. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2012) (setting the patent term as twenty years from the date the
application was ﬁled).
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the AIA illustrates, effective patent reform must also include post-issuance
solutions. The emerging mechanisms of quick decisions identiﬁed in this Article
offer a vital compromise, avoiding the downsides of closer or costlier examina
tion ex ante but also improving the efﬁciency of litigation ex post.
To set the stage for Part III’s exploration of those mechanisms, this Part
begins by sketching a framework, grounded in considerations about the social
cost of patent litigation, to help determine the optimal timing of adjudicating
patent disputes. It then situates the recent move toward quick decisions in patent
cases alongside broader developments in civil procedure that have facilitated
fast resolution.
A. AN ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK

Although many critiques of the patent system center on the behavior of
so-called patent trolls (I will generally use the less pejorative term non
practicing entity, or NPE), those entities’ effect on social welfare has been the
subject of intense debate. Some evidence suggests that NPEs harm innova
tion,116 and a recent report by the Federal Trade Commission suggests that
many NPEs are mainly interested in obtaining what the Commission character
izes as “nuisance-value” settlements.117 But NPEs have their defenders. They
note that NPEs can facilitate innovation by helping individuals and small
companies monetize inventions,118 and they criticize studies condemning NPEs
both for overestimating the costs of NPE patent assertions119 and for placing too

116. See, e.g., Lauren Cohen et al., Patent Trolls: Evidence from Targeted Firms 4 (Harvard Bus.
Sch. Fin. Working Paper No. 15-002, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2464303 [https://perma.cc/QUY
7-VZN6]; Stephen Kiebzak et al., The Effect of Patent Litigation and Patent Assertion Entities on
Entrepreneurial Activity 3–4 (June 16, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=
2457611 [https://perma.cc/Z5ZG-4TFS]; Roger Smeets, Does Patent Litigation Reduce Corporate
R&D? An Analysis of U.S. Public Firms 3–5 (Apr. 28, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=2443048 [https://perma.cc/S2UF-2UN7].
117. See U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PATENT ASSERTION ENTITY ACTIVITY: AN FTC STUDY 101 (2016),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/ﬁles/documents/reports/patent-assertion-entity-activity-ftc-study/p131203_
patent_assertion_entity_activity_an_ftc_study_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/96F3-RCTB]. But see Anne LayneFarrar, What Can the FTC’s §6(b) PAE Study Teach Us? A Practical Review of the Study’s Methodol
ogy, Results, and Policy Recommendations 46 (Nov. 16, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.
com/abstract=2885991 [https://perma.cc/8PUJ-8HDW] (noting that the FTC study provides little
insight about whether the settlement amounts cited as evidence of nuisance litigation “properly reﬂect
the value of the patents asserted”); Matthew L. Spitzer, Trolls, Nuisance Suits, and the FTC 3 (Nw.
Univ. Pritzker Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Series, No. 17-14, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=
3064104, [https://perma.cc/X7UA-QZ53] (critiquing the FTC’s report for using the pejorative phrase
“nuisance suit” instead of the more neutral term, “Negative Expected Value (NEV) suit,” which can
“mislead the reader into thinking that [the] suits are meritless”); Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H.
Ginsburg, The FTC PAE Study: A Cautionary Tale About Making Unsupported Policy Recommenda
tions 2 (George Mason Univ. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, No. 16-45, 2016), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=2867110 [https://perma.cc/H2KW-6PTL] (asserting that the FTC’s sample was small and
potentially unrepresentative).
118. See Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 457, 459 (2012).
119. See, e.g., David L. Schwartz & Jay P. Kesan, Essay, Analyzing the Role of Non-Practicing
Entities in the Patent System, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 425, 433 (2014).
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many patent owners in the NPE category.120 Without wading too deeply into
that debate, I simply note that concerns about NPEs highlight arguably problem
atic aspects of the patent system. Namely, many issued patents are probably
invalid, and patent litigation can be expensive. Regardless of the labels afﬁxed
to particular plaintiffs, eliminating invalid patents and reducing litigation costs
would improve the patent system.
The standard economic view is that systems of dispute resolution should aim
to minimize the social cost of litigation, which includes both process costs (that
is, the parties’ private litigation costs plus the public cost of operating the
system) and the error costs of over- or under-enforcing legal rights.121 Under
this economic approach to legal decision making (sometimes termed “decision
theory”122), process costs and error costs are inversely proportional. More
intricate decision-making processes are more expensive but should yield fewer
errors,123 and vice versa.124
In practice, however, the relationship between process and error costs is not
as neat as theory suggests. For example, in many patent cases, technologically
complex questions—including questions of law about patent validity—are de
cided by a jury. Jury trials are quite expensive to the parties, and the mere threat
of a jury trial can increase the amount an accused infringer is willing to pay to
settle a dispute.125 But there is little reason to think that the costlier decisionmaking mechanism of the jury increases accuracy beyond what a judge would
provide. Likewise, the new administrative review proceedings before expert
judges at the PTAB have probably increased the accuracy of patent validity
adjudications, but, as I explain below, costs have also increased substantially,
and perhaps disproportionately, to any increase in accuracy.126
Regardless of the precise relationship between process and error costs, the
overarching normative aim remains to reduce those costs as much as possible.
So one goal (though by no means the only goal) of the litigation system is to
accurately identify low-merit suits, such as suits asserting patents that are likely
invalid or that are ﬁled against defendants who probably are not infringing, and
to dispose of them at a low cost. If low-merit suits are not quickly and
accurately identiﬁed, error costs increase and defendants who have not acted
120. See, e.g., Michael Risch, Editorial, Framing the Patent Troll Debate, 24 EXPERT OPINION ON
THERAPEUTIC PATS. 127, 127 (2014).
121. See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 400 (1973).
122. See Joseph Scott Miller, Error Costs & IP Law, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 175, 178 & n.12 (citing
additional literature).
123. For present purposes, I deﬁne “error” by reference to whether a legal claim satisﬁes the
requirements of governing doctrine. It is of course possible that those doctrines are suboptimal from a
policy perspective. A primary purpose of Part III of this Article is to consider how possible law/policy
misalignments affect a normative evaluation of quick decisions in patent cases.
124. McGeveran, Trademark Fair Use Reform, supra note 46, at 2280.
125. See Mark A. Lemley, Why Do Juries Decide if Patents Are Valid?, 99 VA. L. REV. 1673,
1728–29 (2013) (exploring the consequences of eliminating jury trials in patent cases).
126. See infra Section III.A.1.
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unlawfully (as well as the public) are forced to bear the process costs of
unjustiﬁed litigation. To be sure, those process costs might not actually be
imposed in every case. A rational plaintiff might prefer to credibly threaten to
impose those costs but not actually conduct the litigation, which is costly to the
plaintiff, too. In the longer run, a system that regularly allows unmeritorious
claims to proceed (giving bite to a plaintiff’s threat of costly litigation) can
facilitate strike suits—or threats of suit—aimed at forcing quick settlements,
which is precisely how many observers perceive the patent system to currently
work.127
From an ex ante perspective, if patentees can impose (or credibly threaten to
impose) process costs on defendants regardless of the merit of their claims, the
incentive to avoid infringement (say, by doing patent searches) is reduced
because litigation would seem to be inevitable—an error cost resulting in
underdeterrence of patent infringement.128 If process costs are sufﬁciently large,
those defendants may avoid the activities that led them to become litigation
targets in the ﬁrst place—an error cost resulting in overdeterrence by subjecting
noninfringing activity to litigation or threatened litigation.129
In addition to providing mechanisms for defendants to obtain quick and
inexpensive decisions in cases involving low-merit claims, it is also imperative
to render accurate decisions. Only those claims that are actually low merit
under governing law should be dismissed, and meritorious claims should pro
ceed to ﬁnal resolution as efﬁciently as possible.130 But it can be difﬁcult to
achieve speed, low costs, and high accuracy when the underlying legal doctrines
involve complex and fact-intensive questions.131 Unfortunately, this is largely
the case in patent law. For example, nonobviousness,132 “the sine qua non of

127. See, e.g., U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 117, at 8–9.
128. The content of patent law itself can also affect the incentive to search. Notably, an accused
infringer that performs a good faith pre-infringement search will probably avoid the enhanced damages
that can follow a ﬁnding of willful infringement. See Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct.
1923, 1932 (2016).
129. See Hylton, supra note 35, at 46 (discussing the relationship between the social cost of
litigation and deterrence). Some might suggest that, in the patent system at least, the risk of market exit
is more theoretical than real. Cf. Richard Lloyd, The Biggest US Patent Litigation Targets See a Big
Drop Off in Cases in 2016, IAM (Jan. 13, 2017), http://www.iam-media.com/blog/Detail.aspx?g=
5e24b330-d605-4055-9189-a6aaf87c593e [https://perma.cc/55HA-UJDL] (reporting Apple, Samsung,
and Amazon as being among the top ﬁve patent infringement defendants).
130. This is not to say that the legal system should strive for perfect accuracy; increases in accuracy
are usually accompanied by increases in litigation costs and time to ﬁnal adjudication. See A.A.S.
Zuckerman, Quality and Economy in Civil Procedure: The Case for Commuting Correct Judgments for
Timely Judgments, 14 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 353, 378 (1994) (“[I]n some cases maximal accuracy, in
the sense of a decision reached after employing the full panoply of procedural devices, is inimical to
timely justice, in the sense of rendering a decision before its utility has seriously declined through the
passage of time.”).
131. See Bone, Trade Secret Law, supra note 46, at 279.
132. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012).
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patentability,”133 is a fact-intensive inquiry into the scope and content of the
prior art, the differences between the prior art and the claimed invention, the
level of ordinary skill in the art, and “secondary considerations” such as
commercial success and failure of others.134 Other key grounds of patent
validity—most notably novelty135 and enablement136—are likewise heavily fact
dependent.137 Infringement, too, is a question of fact that typically cannot be
resolved until claim construction occurs,138 which is usually during or after
discovery.139 Likewise, remedial doctrines in patent law are notoriously openended and fact-speciﬁc. Prime examples include the ﬁfteen-factor test applied to
determine a reasonable royalty for patent infringement140 and the discretionary
standard for determining willful infringement.141 Lastly, and even setting aside
the fact-intensive nature of key patent law doctrines, the accused infringer’s
Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial makes it difﬁcult for a court to enter a
quick, litigation-ending decision in favor of the patentee.142
The upshot is that many patent cases are not amenable to quick, low-cost
resolution. Despite the Federal Circuit’s oft-discussed penchant for adopting
bright-line rules as opposed to fuzzy standards,143 the key grounds on which
most patent cases are decided require an investigation into the unique facts of
that particular case. That holds true regardless of whether the governing doc
trine looks like a rule or a standard, meaning that any preference for bright-line
rules among the Federal Circuit judges does not necessarily translate to quicker
or cheaper adjudication.144 Although many important issues can be resolved on

133. Roanwell Corp. v. Plantronics, Inc., 429 U.S. 1004, 1005 (1976) (White, J., dissenting from the
denial of certiorari).
134. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).
135. A patent lacks novelty if all of its limitations are found in a single prior art reference. See 35
U.S.C. § 102(a). Obviousness, by contrast, is a ﬁnding that an invention does not possess the required
originality even though the invention is not identically disclosed in a single reference. See id. § 103.
136. See id. § 112(a) (requiring the patent to include “a written description of the invention, and of
the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable
any person skilled in the art to which it pertains . . . to make and use the same”).
137. Novelty is a question of fact, requiring the fact-ﬁnder to compare the patent claim to the
allegedly anticipating prior art reference. See Key Pharm. v. Hercon Labs. Corp., 161 F.3d 709, 714
(Fed. Cir. 1998). Enablement, like obviousness, is a legal question that turns on subsidiary questions of
fact about the ability of a person of ordinary skill in the art to recreate the patented invention without
undue experimentation. See Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d 1555, 1573
(Fed. Cir. 1992).
138. See Gen. Mills, Inc. v. Hunt-Wesson, Inc., 103 F.3d 978, 981 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
139. See PETER S. MENELL ET AL., PATENT CASE MANAGEMENT JUDICIAL GUIDE 5-5 (3d ed. 2016).
140. Ga.-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
141. See infra notes 425–30 and accompanying text.
142. Cf. Lemley, supra note 125, at 1719–20 (arguing that “the legal support for [a Seventh
Amendment jury trial right in patent cases] is far from airtight”).
143. See, e.g., John R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 771, 773
(2003).
144. Cf. Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 596
(1992) (casting doubt on the common assumption “that standards tend to be complex in operation
compared to the rules that might replace them”).
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summary judgment, by then the parties will have proceeded through discovery,
the most expensive phase of the litigation.
Remarkably, despite the rich literature on the economics of civil proce
dure,145 little of that writing focuses on interim court decisions in litigation,
such as rulings on motions to dismiss or motions for summary judgment.146 In
one important exception, Keith Hylton has modeled the choice between using
pleading standards versus summary judgment as a screening device.147 He
argues that the rigor of pleading standards should vary based on how difﬁcult it
is to satisfy the underlying rule of substantive law and on the social cost of the
relevant litigation.148 This explains, in Hylton’s view, why the law imposes
heightened pleading standards for claims such as fraud,149 which are “difﬁcult
to prove and impose[] substantial social costs beyond litigation expenses,” such
as reputational harm.150 Hylton emphasizes that early dismissals are particularly
important for claims that are unlikely to succeed on the merits.151 Dismissing
those claims before they impose signiﬁcant costs (for instance, on a motion to
dismiss rather than at summary judgment) can enhance defendants’ incentives
to comply with the law because they will know that claims challenging lawful
conduct will be disposed of at minimal cost.152 Early dismissals of low-merit
claims also, of course, discourage plaintiffs from using litigation to obtain
settlements that are unwarranted given the weakness of the claim.
Louis Kaplow, in his pathmarking work on multistage adjudication, empha
sizes that the decision whether to continue or terminate a case requires balanc
ing three factors: the increased deterrence that stems from continuation, the
possibility that continuation will chill benign acts, and the increased process
costs from continuation.153 Those considerations vary considerably in different
areas of law and even from one case to another. Their interactions are particu
larly complex when adjudication is expensive, as it is in patent cases. The high
costs of litigation favor earlier termination,154 but those costs can also serve a
deterrence function ex ante.155 Thus, as Kaplow acknowledges, “implementa

145. For an accessible introduction, see ROBERT G. BONE, THE ECONOMICS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (2003).
146. See Louis Kaplow, Multistage Adjudication, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1179, 1186 (2013) (identifying
this gap in the literature).
147. See Hylton, supra note 35.
148. Id. at 62.
149. See FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
150. Hylton, supra note 35, at 41–42.
151. Id. at 41.
152. See id.
153. Kaplow, supra note 146, at 1296.
154. Louis Kaplow, Optimal Multistage Adjudication, 33 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 613, 616 (2017).
Kaplow suggests that, because adjudication costs become sunk as a case moves toward later stages,
screening rules should be more stringent at earlier stages than at later stages. See id. at 644. This
argument challenges the prevailing practice of relatively lax screening rules at the outset of a case (for
example, on a motion to dismiss) with more stringent rules applying as the case proceeds through
summary judgment and trial.
155. Id. at 616.
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tion of an optimal approach requires [difﬁcult] contextual judgments by legal
decisionmakers.”156
In this Article, I try to provide such a contextual analysis grounded in the law
of patents and the process of patent litigation. As a positive matter, this analysis
shows how numerous recent changes in patent law can be conceptualized as
efforts to reduce process costs by resolving patent cases at an earlier stage
without signiﬁcantly increasing the risk of erroneous decisions. As a normative
matter, widespread concerns about low-merit infringement claims and the high
cost of patent litigation suggest that providing quick decisions is a reasonable
goal. But not all quick decisions are cheap, and quick decisions might be
erroneous, so there are many nuances and complications to explore.
B. QUICK DECISIONS IN CONTEXT

Before commencing that analysis, it is worth noting that the move toward
quick resolution is not unique to patent law. As has been well documented, the
civil trial has been disappearing from American courtrooms for nearly a century.
In the 1930s, roughly 20% of federal civil cases ended with a trial.157 Today that
number is less than 2%.158 The disappearance of the trial reﬂects a trend toward
settlement that has been inﬂuenced by numerous factors, including the pre-trial
fact development permitted by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the grow
ing importance of institutional litigants who participate in litigation with a view
toward long-term interests, and the emergence of judicial case management, in
which the judge’s function is mainly to facilitate settlement.159
Developments in the law of civil procedure reﬂect a trend not just toward
early settlement but early decisions. In three famous cases decided in 1986, the
Supreme Court made clear that courts should freely use summary judgment to
resolve cases before trial.160 More recently, in Ashcroft v. Iqbal and Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, the Court made it easier to dismiss complaints at the pleading
stage by requiring plaintiffs to include in the complaint “factual allegations”
that “plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”161 This plausibility standard
was previously found in the Court’s summary judgment case law,162 and
156. Kaplow, supra note 146, at 1189–90.
157. Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process, 1994 WIS. L.
REV. 631, 633 n.3.
158. See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in
Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 462–63 (2004) (reporting that trials
accounted for 1.8% of dispositions in 2002).
159. See John H. Langbein, The Disappearance of Civil Trial in the United States, 122 YALE L.J.
522, 544–66 (2012).
160. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 249–50 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585–86
(1986).
161. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556–57
(2007).
162. See, e.g., Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 596 (“[T]he absence of any plausible motive to engage in the
conduct charged is highly relevant to whether a ‘genuine issue for trial’ exists within the meaning of
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plausibility analysis makes a motion to dismiss resemble a quick-look decision
on the merits.163 Numerous other recent developments also facilitate speedy
resolution, including Supreme Court decisions that make it easier for defendants
to defeat class actions at the certiﬁcation stage,164 that make it easier for
government ofﬁcials to establish qualiﬁed immunity on summary judgment,165
and that embrace alternative dispute resolution,166 which is perceived to resolve
disputes with greater speed and at lower cost.
The move toward quick decisions in patent cases is in some ways situated
within these broader trends. For example, the Supreme Court’s summary judg
ment trilogy facilitated the increased granting of those motions on the issue of
infringement.167 Twombly and Iqbal, coupled with amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, have made it easier for courts in patent cases to grant
prediscovery motions to dismiss.168 Policy discussions of patent litigation regu
larly invoke tropes about abusive and frivolous lawsuits—the same rhetoric that
has pervaded policy discussions of civil litigation generally.169 And many
(though not all) of the changes to patent law favor defendants, much like the
recent changes in civil procedure.170
Yet other aspects of the move toward quick decisions in patent cases are
unique to patent law. For example, changes in substantive patent doctrine, such
as the law of patent eligibility, the rules of claim construction, and the doctrine
of nonobviousness, have played key roles in opening procedural routes to quick
decisions.171 Moreover, unlike in civil procedure, where the Supreme Court is
often explicit about its motivation of protecting parties (particularly defendants)
from the expense of litigation,172 the Court rarely mentions litigation costs

Rule 56(e).”); see also Suja A. Thomas, The New Summary Judgment Motion: The Motion to Dismiss
Under Iqbal and Twombly, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 15, 29–30 (2010) (“[T]he Supreme Court has
established standards for summary judgment and for the motion to dismiss that are substantially the
same . . . . [U]nder both standards, a court determines the plausibility of the claim.”).
163. Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 30 (2010).
164. E.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011).
165. See Jack M. Beermann, Qualiﬁed Immunity and Constitutional Avoidance, 2009 SUP. CT. REV.
139, 148–49 (discussing cases that “dramatically expanded the immunity defense and made it more
likely that defendants would prevail before trial” (footnote omitted)).
166. See, e.g., Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013); AT&T Mobility LLC
v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
167. See Matthew D. Henry & John L. Turner, Across Five Eras: Patent Validity and Infringement
Rates in U.S. Courts, 1929–2006, 13 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 454, 479 (2016).
168. See infra Section III.A.3.
169. See Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Litigation Reform: An Institutional Approach, 162 U.
PA. L. REV. 1543, 1598–99 (2014).
170. See Arthur R. Miller, Simpliﬁed Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on the Merits:
Reﬂections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 304 (2013).
171. For a general discussion of the move toward “substance speciﬁc procedure” in federal litiga
tion, see Alexandra D. Lahav, Procedural Design 63–68 (Aug. 4, 2017) (unpublished manuscript).
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3013961[https://perma.cc/ENJ3-3NCR].
172. See, e.g., Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 685 (2010) (describing
“the beneﬁts of private dispute resolution: lower costs, greater efﬁciency and speed, and the ability to
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when justifying its decisions in patent cases.173 Thus, although current trends in
patent litigation are consistent with broader developments in civil procedure,
they are sufﬁciently unique to warrant independent analysis.
III. TOWARD QUICK DECISIONS IN PATENT CASES
This Part sets out the Article’s core descriptive claim, showing how numerous
recent changes in patent law facilitate quicker and potentially lower-cost deci
sions in patent infringement disputes. It also offers a preliminary normative
evaluation of those changes, balancing gains in speed and cost savings against
potential losses in accuracy.
A. PREDISCOVERY DECISIONS

I focus initially on legal changes that enable prediscovery resolution of patent
litigation because those developments offer the greatest potential for cost
savings.174
1. Post-Issuance Review at the PTO
The new administrative proceedings created by the AIA are the most obvious
examples of a move toward resolving patent disputes before the parties incur
signiﬁcant expenses. The AIA itself imposes rigorous timing requirements. For
example, an accused infringer who wishes to pursue inter partes review must do
so within one year of being sued for infringement,175 and AIA proceedings must
conclude within one year of the PTAB’s decision to institute review.176 On
average, AIA proceedings take ﬁfteen months from ﬁling the petition (on which
the PTAB bases its decision to institute review) to ﬁnal decision.177 By compari
son, the duration of patent litigation from ﬁling to disposition via trial or

choose expert adjudicators to resolve specialized disputes”); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
558 (2007) (“[I]t is one thing to be cautious before dismissing an antitrust complaint in advance of
discovery but quite another to forget that proceeding to antitrust discovery can be expensive.” (citation
omitted)).
173. See infra note 263.
174. In addition to examining the stage at which a case was resolved, there are other methods of
estimating litigation costs, such as counting the number of docket entries, party motions, judicial
orders, or hearings. See, e.g., Christopher A. Cotropia et al., Endogenous Litigation Costs: An
Empirical Analysis of Patent Disputes 3 (Nw. Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 17-01, Univ. of Ill.
Coll. of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 17-14, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2893503
[https://perma.cc/UL2Q-LYAV]. But the stage of resolution provides a rough proxy for overall costs,
which is sufﬁcient for my purposes. See, e.g., Kaplow, supra note 146, at 1189–90 (using stage of
resolution in a cost–beneﬁt analysis of adjudication timing).
175. 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) (2012).
176. Id. §§ 316(a)(11), 326(a)(11); 37 C.F.R. § 42.300(c) (2012). The PTAB can extend this deadline
up to six months with good cause. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(11).
177. Brian J. Love & Shawn Ambwani, Inter Partes Review: An Early Look at the Numbers, 81 U.
CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 93, 99 (2014).
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summary judgment is usually over two-and-a-half years.178
These expedited proceedings at the PTO, which address only the issue of
validity, help mitigate incentives that exist in litigation to argue for noninfringe
ment or to settle because they are fast, cheap, and conclude more quickly than
litigation. Moreover, unlike in litigation between private parties, the PTAB can
continue to review the patent’s validity even after the parties settle.179 This
occurs most commonly when the parties settle late in the proceedings.180 The
PTAB has also said it will decline to terminate proceedings when the challenged
claims are “clearly . . . unpatentable,”181 and it has refused to terminate
proceedings when infringement litigation is pending against defendants who are
not parties to the PTAB settlement.182
Yet the existence of concurrent litigation can undermine the cost savings
provided by the PTO’s fast proceedings. Nearly 90% of patents involved in AIA
proceedings are also involved in litigation.183 Simultaneous proceedings can
facilitate duplicative litigation, produce uncertainty about a patent’s status as
valid or invalid, and incentivize wasteful procedural maneuvering. In part
because the courts and the PTO apply different standards of proof and rules of
claim construction (for reasons I will explain shortly), the federal courts in
several recent cases have rejected challenges to a patent’s validity but the PTO
has subsequently found the same patent to be invalid.184 The Federal Circuit has

178. Jonathan H. Ashtor, Opening Pandora’s Box: Analyzing the Complexity of U.S. Patent Litigation, 18 YALE J.L. & TECH. 217, 227 (2016).
179. 35 U.S.C. §§ 317(a), 327(a).
180. See, e.g., Blackberry Corp. v. Mobilemedia Ideas LLC, No. IPR2013-00016 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 11,
2013) (declining to terminate inter partes review when the parties settled seven months after institution,
one day before a scheduled hearing); see also In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268,
1272 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (noting that the court granted the challenger’s motion to withdraw as appellee
pursuant to a settlement agreement), aff’d sub nom. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131
(2016).
181. Rules of Practice for Trials Before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board and Judicial Review of
Patent Trial and Appeal Board Decisions, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,612, 48,648 (Aug. 14, 2012).
182. See, e.g., Yahoo! Inc. v. CreateAds LLC, No. IPR2014-00200, 2015 WL 1009199 (P.T.A.B.
Feb. 26, 2015) (refusing to terminate a proceeding when more than ten other cases alleging infringe
ment of the same patent were pending against other defendants).
183. See Saurabh Vishnubhakat et al., Strategic Decision Making in Dual PTAB and District Court
Proceedings, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 45, 69 (2016).
184. See, e.g., Tinnus Enters., LLC v. Telebrands Corp., 846 F.3d 1190, 1202 n.7, 1208 (Fed.
Cir. 2017) (afﬁrming preliminary injunction even though the PTAB had found the patent to be invalid;
the district court eventually stayed the case after more than a year of litigation, see Tinnus Enters., LLC
v. Telebrands Corp., No. 6:15-cv-551, 2017 WL 379471, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 24, 2017)); Apple Inc.
v. Smartﬂash LLC, No. CBM2015-00028, 2016 WL 3035555 (P.T.A.B. May 26, 2016) (PTAB
issuing ﬁnal written decision ﬁnding patent to be invalid over a year after a jury returned a verdict in
the patentee’s favor on infringement and validity, see Smartﬂash LLC v. Apple Inc., No. 6:13-cv-447,
2015 WL 11089752 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 2, 2015); see also Smartﬂash LLC v. Apple Inc., 680 F. App’x
977, 984 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (invalidating the asserted patents on appeal from the district court’s
judgment)); Warsaw Orthopedic, Inc. v. Nuvasive, Inc., No. 3:08-cv-01512, 2016 WL 4466973, at *1
(S.D. Cal. June 15, 2016) (patent invalidated in ex parte reexamination after the Federal Circuit
afﬁrmed court rulings in the patentee’s favor on validity and infringement and remanded for a new trial
on damages); Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Toshiba Corp., 221 F. Supp. 3d 534, 554 n.18 (D. Del.
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attempted to address the problem of differing court and PTO decisions on
validity with a bright-line “absolute ﬁnality” rule, holding that the ﬁrst proceed
ing to reach an irrevocably ﬁnal decision controls.185 That rule encourages
parties to race to a quick, ﬁnal decision when a court and the PTO reach
different conclusions.186 But that race will occur between the same parties in
two different proceedings, meaning that the existence of PTO review probably
does not result in any savings in litigation costs. Indeed, it may increase
them.187
To be sure, in the mine-run of cases, district courts stay litigation before the
possibility of divergent rulings arises.188 In fact, the portion of the AIA that
created the covered business method review program contains a special provi
sion that supporters of the AIA believed would place a “heavy thumb on the
scale in favor of a stay.”189 Though a stay extends the duration of a court case, if
the PTAB invalidates the asserted patents, the stay can result in the litigation

2016) (denying motion to stay even though the PTAB had invalidated some of the asserted patent
claims, noting that “[w]hile the PTAB has ruled the relevant claims invalid, should the Federal Circuit
overturn the PTAB, addressing these additional grounds at trial is more efﬁcient than having to try
invalidity on these grounds at a much later date”); Paice LLC v. Hyundai Motor Co., No. 12-cv-499,
2015 WL 10677197 (D. Md. Oct. 1, 2015) (jury verdict in favor of the plaintiffs on an infringement
claim; the asserted patents were later invalidated by the PTAB, see Ford Motor Co. v. Paice LLC, No.
IPR2014-00904, 2015 WL 8536745 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 10, 2015), aff’d, 685 F. App’x 950 (Fed. Cir.
2017); Ford Motor Co. v. Paice LLC, No. IPR2014-00875, 2015 WL 7695188 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 23,
2015), aff’d in part, vacated in part, and remanded, 681 F. App’x 885 (Fed. Cir. 2017)); Ultratec, Inc.
v. Sorenson Commc’ns, Inc., No. 13-CV-346, 2015 WL 2248437 (W.D. Wis. May 13, 2015) (PTAB
issued ﬁnal written decision invaliding the patents-in-suit roughly six months after the jury returned a
verdict in the patentee’s favor), appeal dismissed, 611 F. App’x 720 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Pers. Audio LLC
v. CBS Corp., No. 2:13-cv-270, 2014 WL 7741716 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 15, 2014) (jury verdict in favor of
the plaintiff on an infringement claim; the asserted patent was later invalidated by the PTAB, see Elec.
Frontier Found. v. Pers. Audio LLC, No. IPR2014-00070, 2014 WL 8584938 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 10, 2014),
aff’d, 867 F.3d 1246 (Fed. Cir. 2017)).
185. Gugliuzza, supra note 1, at 295–305 (discussing ePlus, Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc., 789 F.3d
1349 (Fed. Cir. 2015), Versata Comput. Indus. Sols, Inc. v. SAP AG, 564 F. App’x 600 (Fed. Cir. 2014),
and Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 721 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2013)).
186. See, e.g., id. at 300 (discussing the procedural history of Versata, 564 F. App’x 600).
187. For a critique of the absolute ﬁnality rule that raises concerns about litigation costs, see ePlus,
Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc., 790 F.3d 1307, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Moore, J., dissenting from the
denial of the petition for rehearing en banc) (“After an expensive, multi-year litigation with a full trial
which Defendant lost, it ought not to be able to turn around and rely on the PTO to undo the prior
district court litigation. To allow this encourages defendants to scrap and ﬁght to keep underlying
litigation pending in the hope that they will fare better with the PTO and then be able to unravel the
district court judgment against them.” (footnote omitted)).
188. See, e.g., Love & Ambwani, supra note 177, at 96, 103 (reporting that, for inter partes review
petitions ﬁled between September 2012 and March 2014, district courts granted roughly 80% of
motions seeking a stay pending an instituted review).
189. 157 CONG. REC. S1363–65 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (remarks of Sen. Schumer) (describing
America Invents Act section 18(b)(1)(D), which directs courts to consider whether a stay “will reduce
the burden of litigation”—something a stay, by deﬁnition, will always do); see Jonathan Stroud et al.,
Stay Awhile: The Evolving Law of District Court Stays in Light of Inter Partes Review, Post-Grant
Review, and Covered Business Method Post-Grant Review, 11 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 226, 241 (2015)
(reporting that district courts have denied with prejudice less than 20% of motions seeking a stay
pending instituted covered business method review).
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being resolved relatively cheaply even though it was technically pending for a
year or more.190
But a stay of litigation is not guaranteed. Courts commonly deny stays if the
accused infringer delays petitioning the PTO,191 if there are patent claims in the
litigation on which the PTO has not instituted review,192 if there are non-patent
claims in the complaint,193 or if the parties are direct competitors in the
market.194 Stay practices also vary signiﬁcantly among the federal district
courts. The Eastern District of Texas, which, before the Supreme Court’s recent
decision changing the law of venue in patent cases,195 handled over 40% of all
patent cases ﬁled nationwide,196 denied over 40% of stay motions between
January 2014 and July 2016. By comparison, the Northern District of California
denied only about 20% of stay motions during that period.197
In short, although AIA proceedings can be quick and cheap standing alone,
they sometimes add another layer of costs to already-expensive patent disputes.
Duplication of litigation can occur because court decisions have almost no
preclusive effect at the PTO and vice versa. The Supreme Court, in a trademark
case, recently conﬁrmed that preclusion between the courts and the PTO can be
appropriate, but the two forums must be applying the same legal standard for
preclusion to apply.198 In patent proceedings, although the courts and the PTO
are deciding the same question—does the patent satisfy the requirements of the
Patent Act?—the legal standards differ. In court, patent claims are construed
190. See Doug Lichtman, Patient Patents: Can Certain Types of Patent Litigation Be Beneﬁcially
Delayed?, 46 J. LEGAL STUD. 427, 430 (2017) (describing the beneﬁts of delaying litigation to allow the
PTO to issue a decision that is “ﬁrst in time and hence . . . binding on later [court] proceedings”).
191. See, e.g., Universal Elecs., Inc. v. Universal Remote Control, Inc., 943 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1031,
1035 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (denying a stay when the accused infringer “did not ﬁle its inter partes review
petitions until almost a year after being served with the complaint”).
192. See, e.g., Tire Hanger Corp. v. Mr. Car Guy Concierge Serv. Inc., No. 5:14-cv-00549, 2015 WL
857888, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2015).
193. See, e.g., Nippon Steel & Sumito Metal Corp. v. POSCO, No. 12-2429, 2013 WL 1867042, at
*7, *10 (D.N.J. May 2, 2013) (denying a stay pending inter partes reexamination in a case involving
both patent and unfair competition claims). But cf. Delphix Corp. v. Actiﬁo, Inc., No. 13-cv-04613,
2014 WL 6068407, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2014) (granting a partial stay in a case involving both
patent and trade secret claims).
194. See, e.g., Courtesy Prods., L.L.C. v. Hamilton Beach Brands, Inc., Civ. No. 13-2012, 2015 WL
5145526, at *2 (D. Del. Sept. 1, 2015).
195. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
196. Dennis Crouch, The Concentrated Market of Patent Jurisdictions, PATENTLY-O (Oct. 8, 2015),
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/10/concentrated-patent-jurisdictions.html [https://perma.cc/K93N
6U76].
197. Brian J. Love & James Yoon, Predictably Expensive: A Critical Look at Patent Litigation in the
Eastern District of Texas, 2017 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 27; see MORGAN LEWIS, 2017 PTAB DIGEST: THE
LATEST TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS IN POST-GRANT PROCEEDINGS 28 (2017), https://www.morganlewis.
com/media/ﬁles/publication/report/ptab%20post%20grant%20proceedings_ﬁn_screen.ashx?la=en
[https://perma.cc/Q6JE-27CT] (reporting that the Northern District of Illinois and the Northern District
of California are the most likely to grant a contested motion to stay pending inter partes review, with
grant rates of 82% and 74%, respectively, and that the Eastern District of Texas is among the least
likely to grant a contested motion to stay, with a grant rate of 25%).
198. See B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1299, 1303 (2015).
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consistent with their usual meaning to a person of ordinary skill in the art,199
and the patent challenger must prove invalidity by clear and convincing evi
dence.200 The PTO, by contrast, gives patent claims their broadest reasonable
interpretation,201 and invalidity must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence.202
To be clear, a ﬁnal, case-ending decision that a patent is invalid, either by a
court or by the PTO, does bind its counterpart; that is the upshot of the absolute
ﬁnality rule discussed above.203 But many decisions that would be entitled to
preclusive effect, at least between the same parties, if the PTO and the courts
were applying the same legal standard receive no preclusive effect at all,
including a ruling in the patentee’s favor on the issue of validity, a ruling of
invalidity in a dispute that has not yet fully concluded, and any ruling on claim
construction.204 Moreover, although estoppel provisions in the AIA bar petition
ers from reasserting in court particular invalidity arguments they made or could
have made at the PTAB,205 some courts have interpreted those provisions
narrowly, applying them only to arguments on which the PTAB actually insti
tuted review.206
By staying litigation pending PTO review in most cases, the courts have
attempted to make the current system as efﬁcient as they can. Any change to
more effectively coordinate court and PTO proceedings would probably have to

199. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
200. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 95 (2011). This heightened standard of proof is
imposed because of the statutory presumption of patent validity. 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012).
201. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2012); see also Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131,
2142 (2016) (approving under Chevron the PTO regulation adopting the broadest reasonable interpreta
tion standard) (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)). The
rationale for the broader interpretation standard is that patents can be amended in proceedings at the
PTO. See infra notes 209–15 and accompanying text (questioning whether that rationale applies in AIA
proceedings, where amendments are relatively difﬁcult to obtain).
202. Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422, 1427 (Fed. Cir. 1988). The standard of proof is lower at
the PTO than in court because the statutory presumption of validity—a form of deference to the
agency’s decision making, see infra note 216—does not apply when the agency is making its own
decision about patentability.
203. See supra note 185 and accompanying text. A court decision of invalidity also binds the ITC in
section 337 proceedings, see supra note 48, but ITC decisions do not bind the courts in subsequent
litigation. See Sapna Kumar, The Other Patent Agency: Congressional Regulation of the ITC, 61 FLA.
L. REV. 529, 558, 561–63 (2009).
204. See generally Gugliuzza, supra note 1, at 289 (discussing how the different legal standards
applied by the courts and the PTO minimize the preclusive effect of those tribunals’ rulings). But see
Timothy R. Holbrook, The Patent Trial and Appeal Board’s Evolving Impact on Claim Construction, 24
TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 301, 332 (2016) (suggesting, based on the similarities between PTAB proceed
ings and district court litigation, that PTAB claim constructions could be entitled to preclusive effect in
district court litigation, and vice versa).
205. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 315(e)(2), 325(e)(2).
206. See, e.g., Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Toshiba Corp., 221 F. Supp. 3d 534, 553–54 (D. Del.
2016) (citing Shaw Indus. Grp., Inc. v. Automated Creel Sys., Inc., 817 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). But
see Biscotti Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 13-cv-1015, 2017 WL 2526231, at *5 (E.D. Tex. May 11,
2017) (applying estoppel to grounds included in a petition for inter partes review but determined by the
PTAB not to establish a reasonable likelihood of unpatentability, discussing conﬂicting district court
decisions on the scope of estoppel).
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come from Congress. One option would be to have the courts and the PTO
apply the same standards of claim construction and burdens of proof, to enhance
the preclusive effects of rulings between the two tribunals. The Supreme Court
in 2016 approved the PTO’s application of the broadest reasonable interpreta
tion standard of claim construction in AIA proceedings, rejecting the argument
that the agency should apply the ordinary meaning standard applied by the
courts.207 The Court recognized that the divergent standards facilitate inconsis
tent rulings, but nevertheless granted the PTO Chevron deference.208
That deference, however, would also probably permit the PTO to change
course and apply the same standard of claim construction that applies in court
proceedings. Indeed, the agency’s justiﬁcations for applying the broadest reason
able interpretation standard in AIA proceedings are questionable. For instance,
the PTO has asserted that the broadest reasonable interpretation standard is
justiﬁed by “a party’s ability to amend claims to avoid prior art.”209 But the
opportunity to amend is limited in AIA proceedings,210 and the PTAB has
granted few motions to amend.211 The PTO has also justiﬁed the broadest
reasonable interpretation standard on the ground that it has applied that standard
in reexamination proceedings “for nearly thirty years.”212 Yet reexamination is
fundamentally different than AIA proceedings, a point the PTAB itself has
emphasized in refusing to give preclusive effect to its own reexamination
decisions in AIA proceedings.213 In reexamination, amendments are liberally
permitted—indeed, claim amendment is the most common outcome of ex parte

207. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2142 (2016).
208. Id. at 2142, 2146.
209. Changes to Implement Inter Partes Review Proceedings, Post-Grant Review Proceedings, and
Transitional Program for Covered Business Method Patents, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,680, 48,688 (Aug. 14,
2012) (citing In re Yamamoto, 740 F.2d 1569, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
210. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 316(d)(1) (2012) (allowing the patent owner to ﬁle only one motion to
amend).
211. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MOTION TO AMEND STUDY 6 (Apr. 30, 2016), http://www.uspto.
gov/sites/default/ﬁles/documents/2016-04-30%20PTAB%20MTA%20study.pdf [https://perma.cc/
YH3Q-5ZD9] (reporting that the PTAB granted, in whole or in part, only six motions to amend in the
ﬁrst three-and-a-half years of AIA proceedings, out of 118 decided). The Federal Circuit recently
overturned the PTAB’s practice of placing on the patentee the burden to show that proposed amend
ments are patentable over the prior art. See Aqua Prods., Inc. v. Matal, 872 F.3d 1290, 1296 (Fed. Cir.
2017) (en banc). Though that decision appears to make it easier for patentees to secure amendments,
other considerations suggest that amendments will remain rare in AIA proceedings. See Naveen Modi et
al., Aqua Products: Watershed Decision or Barely a Ripple, LAW360 (Oct. 16, 2017, 1:11 PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/974695 [https://perma.cc/Z32S-KLNU] (discussing limits on the num
ber and scope of amendments that the patentee may propose and how the doctrine of intervening rights
can prevent patentees from recovering past damages if claims have been amended).
212. Changes to Implement Inter Partes Review Proceedings, Post-Grant Review Proceedings, and
Transitional Program for Covered Business Method Patents, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,697–98.
213. See BioDelivery Sci. Int’l, Inc. v. Monosol Rx, LLC, No. IPR2015-00169, 2016 Pat. App.
LEXIS 13050, at *24 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 24, 2016) (“[I]nter partes review under the AIA offers a signiﬁcant
procedural opportunity to the parties that was not available in the prior inter partes reexamination
proceeding.”).
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reexamination (which survives the enactment of the AIA).214 In short, there are
good reasons for the PTO to apply the ordinary meaning claim construction
standard in AIA proceedings. If the PTO applied the ordinary meaning standard,
there would be more preclusion between the courts and the PTO, and the
inefﬁciencies of parallel proceedings would be reduced.215
Another option to facilitate preclusion between the courts and the PTO would
be to have both tribunals apply the same burden of proof on the question of
invalidity. Congress has two basic options on that score. First, it could require
the PTAB to apply the clear and convincing evidence standard that currently
applies in court. That standard, however, is a form of judicial deference to
agency decision making,216 and it makes little sense to say that a three-judge
panel of the PTAB should defer to a prior decision by a single examiner. The
other option would be for both the courts and the PTO to apply a preponderance
of the evidence standard. If, as many believe, the PTO issues too many patents
that do not actually satisfy the requirements for patentability, then the clear and
convincing evidence standard improperly insulates many patents from invalidity
challenges.217 Indeed, the decision to issue a patent, made by a single examiner
with limited time to allocate to the task, does not seem like the type of reasoned
decision making to which court deference is typically appropriate.218
The most radical solution to the problem of parallel proceedings and duplica
tive litigation would be to adopt a regime of staged adjudication in which the
PTO ﬁrst and exclusively resolves all issues of validity and then the courts
decide infringement and remedies.219 Staged adjudication would offer several
potential beneﬁts. First, it would provide the public with more decisions on

214. See EX PARTE REEXAMINATION FILING DATA, supra note 2, at 2 (noting that 66% of claims are
amended in reexamination).
215. Alternatively, Rochelle Dreyfuss has suggested that both the courts and the PTO should apply
the broadest reasonable interpretation standard, noting that its objective nature could enhance unifor
mity and reduce appellate reversal rates. See Dreyfuss, supra note 18, at 269–70. Though it is not clear
that any standard of claim construction can be truly objective given the inherent malleability of the
language used in patent claims, cf. Margaret Jane Radin, Patent Notice and the Trouble with Plain
Meaning, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1093, 1094 (2016) (“[T]here is no such thing as plain meaning that
everybody concerned will accept, especially when it comes to innovative products and processes where
there is money at stake.”), the salient point is that the efﬁciency of proceedings would be enhanced if
the courts and the PTO applied the same claim construction standard, whatever that standard might be.
216. See Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who’s Afraid of the APA? What the Patent System
Can Learn from Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269, 281–82, 284 (2007).
217. See Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law’s Presumption of Validity, 60
STAN. L. REV. 45, 49–51 (2007) (proposing to limit the presumption of validity to situations in which the
patentee submitted to a more rigorous initial examination or a court, the ITC, or the PTO has already
reevaluated validity and found in the patentee’s favor).
218. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (noting that the deference courts give
to an agency decision “will depend upon the thoroughness evident in [the agency’s] consideration, the
validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors
which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control”).
219. For proposals along these lines, see Michael Goodman, What’s So Special About Patent Law?,
26 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 797, 846–48 (2016); Craig Allen Nard, Legitimacy and the
Useful Arts, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 515, 556 (1997).
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patent validity in the relatively quick, inexpensive, and expert forum of the
PTO.220 Second, a PTO afﬁrmation of validity, though it would formally bind
only those accused infringers who were parties to the administrative proceed
ing,221 would generate useful information that could lead to reduced litigation
costs. For example, in future disputes, the PTO would likely treat its own prior
ruling as highly persuasive,222 which would discourage future accused infring
ers from relitigating validity. Finally, a model of strictly staged adjudication, in
which validity is fully resolved before infringement is litigated, would avoid the
problems that arise in other countries where validity and infringement proceed
ings are bifurcated but simultaneous. In Germany, for instance, it is rare for
courts to stay litigation pending administrative review of validity.223 Conse
quently, courts commonly ﬁnd a patent infringed and issue an injunction only
for the patent to be invalidated later in separate administrative proceedings.224
Staged adjudication, however, could have several drawbacks. It could extend
the overall duration of proceedings, particularly in cases in which the PTO
afﬁrms the patent’s validity but there are close questions on infringement.
Indeed, if infringement is easier to decide in a given case, and particularly if the
ruling would be one of noninfringement and would end the case, it seems
questionable to require the parties and the PTO to resolve validity ﬁrst. Also,
litigants could attempt to argue for different claim constructions in the different
tribunals. Patentees, for instance, would argue for narrow constructions at the
PTO to avoid invalidation, and then argue for broad constructions in litigation
to ensnare the infringer’s product or process.225 Thus, strict rules of estoppel
and preclusion would be an essential element of an efﬁcient regime of staged
adjudication. Also, because patent validity could be resolved more quickly and
cheaply at the PTO, parties would be incentivized to challenge more patents,
potentially increasing overall litigation costs.226 Lastly, but most fundamentally,
the Supreme Court is currently considering a case in which it could rule that it is
220. Cf. John F. Duffy, On Improving the Legal Process of Claim Interpretation: Administrative
Alternatives, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 109, 130–31 (2000) (discussing the expertise of the PTO on
patent claim interpretation as a reason for courts to defer to the PTO’s interpretation of patent claims).
221. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940).
222. To draw an analogy, when a patent’s validity is conﬁrmed in ex parte reexamination, courts
typically give that decision some weight in subsequent litigation. See Custom Accessories, Inc. v.
Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 961 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
223. Colleen Chien & Christian Helmers, Inter Partes Review and the Design of Post-Grant Patent
Reviews, 21 STAN. TECH. L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 18), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2601562
[https://perma.cc/2KBT-NV92] (noting that German courts stay infringement proceedings in light of
administrative revocation proceedings only 20% of the time).
224. Katrin Cremers et al., Invalid but Infringed? An Analysis of Germany’s Bifurcated Patent
Litigation, 131 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 218, 219 (2016) (reporting that 12% of awarded injunctions are
based on patents later proved to be invalid).
225. See Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Scope, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2197, 2202–03
(2016) (highlighting the importance of uniﬁed proceedings to determine the scope of IP rights).
226. See William M. Landes, Sequential Versus Unitary Trials: An Economic Analysis, 22 J. LEGAL
STUD. 99, 100–01 (1993) (noting that sequential trials increase the plaintiff’s incentive to sue and
increase the number of lawsuits).
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unconstitutional for the PTO (as compared to the courts) to invalidate issued
patents.227 Although the lower federal courts have repeatedly rejected that
argument,228 a Supreme Court ruling to the contrary would obviously make it
difﬁcult if not impossible to create a regime in which the PTO has the exclusive
power to adjudicate patent validity.
In sum, the administrative proceedings created by the AIA are fast and seem,
at ﬁrst blush, to represent a signiﬁcant savings in litigation-related costs. Indeed,
the PTO itself has touted the new proceedings as “hav[ing] signiﬁcantly changed
the patent landscape by providing a faster, cost-efﬁcient quality check on issued
patents.”229 Yet numerous complexities remain, particularly in the relationship
between those proceedings and concurrent or subsequent infringement litigation
in the federal courts. Finding ways to better coordinate court and PTO proceed
ings is therefore critical to realizing the efﬁciency gains that the PTO’s quick
decisions could provide.
2. Patent-Eligible Subject Matter
Although Congress created the new AIA proceedings for the speciﬁc purpose
of expediting resolution of patent disputes, other recent developments in patent
law achieve the same goal, albeit less explicitly. The foremost example is the
doctrine that has changed most dramatically in the past decade: patentable
subject matter.
Section 101 of the Patent Act permits patents on any new and useful
“process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.”230 Despite that
broad language, courts have long recognized implicit limits on the types of
inventions eligible for patenting. In simplest terms, scientiﬁc principles, natural
laws, and abstract ideas are not patent eligible,231 but speciﬁc applications of
those principles, laws, and ideas are.232 After the Supreme Court appeared to
loosen the requirements of patent eligibility in the early 1980s,233 the Federal
227. Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 639 F. App’x 639 (Fed. Cir.
2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2239 (2017).
228. See, e.g., MCM Portfolio LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 812 F.3d 1284, 1292–93 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (rejecting a challenge to AIA review based on both Article III and the Seventh Amendment);
Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 605 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to
ex parte reexamination); see also Greg Reilly, The Constitutionality of Administrative Patent Cancella
tion, 23 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 377, 380–81 (2017) (arguing that administrative adjudication of patent
validity is consistent with both Article III and the Seventh Amendment).
229. Dennis Crouch, PTAB Procedural Reform Initiative, PATENTLY-O (Apr. 7, 2017) https://patentlyo.
com/patent/2017/04/procedural-reform-initiative.html [https://perma.cc/EA4M-SSRE] (excerpting a PTO
press release).
230. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
231. See, e.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71–72 (1972) (holding that a mathematical
formula is not patent eligible); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 131–32
(1948) (invalidating a patent on a composition of two naturally occurring bacteria).
232. See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187–88 (1981) (holding a method of molding rubber
that used a mathematical formula patent eligible); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309–10
(1980) (holding a manmade bacterium useful for cleaning up oil spills patent eligible).
233. See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309–10.
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Circuit and the PTO further eroded the limits on eligibility in the 1990s and
early 2000s. During that period, the PTO issued many patents on software and
business methods, which, because of their inherently abstract nature, had poorly
deﬁned boundaries.234 This led to high rates of litigation235 even though patents
are not thought to be an important incentive for innovation in those areas.236
Increased patenting of early-stage biotechnology, such as naturally occurring
gene fragments, also created worries about an emerging anticommons—
speciﬁcally, that any practical gene therapy would require the simultaneous use
of numerous different patents.237
Many of these newly issued patents on software, business methods, and basic
biotechnology, even if patent eligible under prevailing section 101 doctrine,
should not, in the view of many observers, have satisﬁed other requirements of
patentability, particularly the nonobviousness requirement of section 103. In
2003, the Federal Trade Commission issued a widely read report arguing that
the Federal Circuit had made it too difﬁcult to prove obviousness,238 as part of a
broader critique of the court’s doctrine for overvaluing patent rights and under
valuing market incentives for innovation.239 Similarly, in an inﬂuential book
published in 2008, Jim Bessen and Mike Meurer argued that the Federal Circuit
had, over the preceding two decades, overseen a proliferation of patents on
trivial advances in technology, particularly in the ﬁeld of computer software.240
Commentators also criticized the Federal Circuit’s obviousness case law in the
area of biotechnology.241
During that time, the Federal Circuit had required, as a prerequisite to ﬁnding
obviousness, that courts or patent examiners identify a speciﬁc “teaching,

234. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 39, at 187–88, 192–93. For a challenge to the conventional
wisdom that the Federal Circuit facilitated the increase in business method patents, see John F. Duffy,
Why Business Method Patents?, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1247, 1251–52 (2011), which argues that the growth
of those patents was driven by the introduction of mathematical and scientiﬁc techniques into the ﬁelds
of economics and business.
235. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 39, at 152–53; see also Michael J. Meurer, Controlling
Opportunistic and Anti-Competitive Intellectual Property Litigation, 44 B.C. L. REV. 509, 542 (2003)
(noting that business method patents present a high risk of “opportunistic lawsuits” because indepen
dent invention is likely and surveillance of research activity by other potential inventors is difﬁcult).
236. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Are Business Method Patents Bad for Business?, 16 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 263, 275 (2000).
237. See DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT
86–89 (2009).
238. U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND
PATENT LAW AND POLICY 10–12 (2003), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/documents/reports/promote
innovation-proper-balance-competition-and-patent-law-and-policy/innovationrpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/
7KMY-RXGF].
239. See Tejas N. Narechania, Patent Conﬂicts, 103 GEO. L.J. 1483, 1493–95 (2015) (describing the
tension between the Commission and the Federal Circuit on matters of innovation policy).
240. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 39, at 212–13.
241. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Speciﬁc?, 17 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1155, 1179 (2002); Arti K. Rai, Intellectual Property Rights in Biotechnology: Addressing
New Technology, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 827, 833 (1999).
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suggestion, or motivation” to combine prior art references.242 That can be a
difﬁcult task, particularly with software and business methods, where key
references are often hidden as source code in a commercial product or consist of
common knowledge of a general business practice.243 In 2007, the Supreme
Court, in KSR International Co. v. Teleﬂex Inc., deemphasized the “teaching,
suggestion, or motivation” test, instead ruling that the obviousness analysis
should be “expansive and ﬂexible.”244 Speciﬁcally, the Court indicated that a
ﬁnding of obviousness can be based on market demands, design incentives, or
even the common sense of a person having ordinary skill in the art.245
By making it easier to prove obviousness, the ﬂexible framework articulated
in KSR helped ameliorate some of the problems created by the generous
standards of patentability embraced by the Federal Circuit and the PTO.246 As
discussed above, however, obviousness is a poor vehicle for quickly invalidating
a patent because it depends on underlying questions of fact.247 Although the
Court in KSR endorsed resolving obviousness on summary judgment,248 summary
judgment typically occurs after the parties have incurred a substantial portion of
discovery-related expenses, if not all of them. And because obviousness is based on
facts, summary judgment is the earliest stage at which the issue can be resolved.
The same goes for other key grounds of invalidity, such as anticipation and
lack of enablement.249 Also, in 2005, the Federal Circuit held that short gene
fragments with no currently known function do not satisfy the Patent Act’s
utility requirement.250 But the Federal Circuit has held that utility is a question
of fact,251 so it, too, cannot be resolved before summary judgment.
Courts treat patent eligibility, by contrast, as a question of law that usually
does not implicate any disputes of fact, meaning that it can be used to invalidate
patents before discovery begins, on a motion to dismiss or for judgment on the
pleadings.252 Thus, the invigorated patent eligibility requirement is, like Con
gress’s expansion of post-issuance proceedings at the PTO, another route to
quick decisions on patent validity.253

242. E.g., In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
243. See Margo A. Bagley, Internet Business Model Patents: Obvious by Analogy, 7 MICH. TELE
COMM. & TECH. L. REV. 253, 279–80 (2001); Mark A. Lemley & David W. O’Brien, Encouraging
Software Reuse, 49 STAN. L. REV. 255, 301–02 (1997).
244. 550 U.S. 398, 415, 419 (2007).
245. Id. at 418.
246. See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr. & Christian T. Johnson, Not So Obvious After All: Patent Law’s
Nonobviousness Requirement, KSR, and the Fear of Hindsight Bias, 47 GA. L. REV. 41, 43 (2012).
247. See supra notes 132–34 and accompanying text.
248. KSR, 550 U.S. at 426–27.
249. See supra notes 135–37.
250. In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
251. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 865 F.2d 1247, 1252 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
252. See, e.g., Bascom Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1347 (Fed.
Cir. 2016).
253. To be clear, the Supreme Court has never held that patent eligibility is devoid of factual considerations.
Indeed, the Court has sometimes based its eligibility analysis on “undisputed” propositions that look like facts.
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To brieﬂy summarize the recent developments in eligibility doctrine (which
have been discussed in detail elsewhere254): In 2010, shortly after the Federal
Circuit began to retreat from prior decisions embracing broad patent eligibility
for business methods,255 the Supreme Court invalidated a patent on a method of
hedging ﬁnancial risk because it claimed “an unpatentable abstract idea.”256
Two years later, the Court invalidated as directed to a law of nature a patent on a
method of administering a drug to a patient and then determining its metabolite
levels in the body.257 The Court emphasized that, beyond reciting the natural
correlation between metabolite levels and drug safety and efﬁcacy, the patent merely
recited “well-understood, routine, conventional activity” that doctors already engaged
in.258 The next year, the Court invalidated patents on isolated sequences of DNA
because they occur in nature.259 Most recently, the Court struck down patents on
computer software that used an intermediary to ensure parties performed a contract.260
The Court reasoned that the idea of using intermediaries already existed in the analog
world and that the patent contained no “inventive concept” to transform that abstract
idea into a “patent-eligible application” of the idea.261
On the surface, the Court’s decisions reﬂect concern about the substance of
patent law: speciﬁcally, that the Federal Circuit and the PTO have too readily
permitted patents on basic concepts that are important to follow-on innovation—
what the Court has called “building blocks of human ingenuity.”262 The Court’s
opinions have made passing reference, at most, to the aim of reducing litigationrelated costs,263 and have not discussed speed to decision at all. Yet the

See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116 (2013). The Court has also
made the seemingly factual question of whether activity covered by the patent is “conventional” an important
criterion in determining eligibility. See, e.g., Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66,
79–80 (2012). Thus, though lower courts often treat eligibility as lacking factual considerations, their approach
may not be correct as a matter of doctrine or as a matter of policy. See infra text accompanying notes 309–12
(suggesting that eligibility could be treated as a question of law based on factual inquiries).
254. See, e.g., Timothy R. Holbrook & Mark D. Janis, Patent-Eligible Processes: An Audience
Perspective, 17 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 349, 356–58 (2015); Jacob S. Sherkow, The Natural
Complexity of Patent Eligibility, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 1151–52 (2014).
255. See, e.g., In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 981 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (afﬁrming the PTO’s rejection of
a patent application claiming a method of requiring and conducting arbitration).
256. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611–12 (2010). The Federal Circuit in Bilski had actually found the
invention to be ineligible for patenting, too. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 949 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc).
257. Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79–80.
258. Id.
259. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2111 (2013).
260. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2352, 2357 (2014).
261. Id. at 2357 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72).
262. E.g., id. at 2354 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 89).
263. See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 656 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing for a
blanket prohibition on business method patents, noting that “[e]ven if a business method patent is ultimately
held invalid, patent holders may be able to use it to threaten litigation and to bully competitors, especially those
that cannot bear the costs of a drawn-out, fact-intensive patent litigation”); Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v.
Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 127 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting from the dismissal of certiorari) (noting
patents can sometimes “discourage research” by, among other things, “leading [researchers] to conduct costly
and time-consuming searches of existing or pending patents” and “requiring complex licensing arrangements”).
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invigoration of the eligibility requirement can help courts resolve infringement dis
putes more quickly and cheaply by allowing validity to be resolved on the pleadings
as a matter of law. As Figure 1 below shows, the number of pleadings-stage dismiss
als on eligibility grounds has dramatically increased since the beginning of the
Supreme Court’s recent string of decisions. Although district courts sometimes grant
motions to dismiss without prejudice, meaning that the plaintiff will have an opportu
nity to ﬁle an amended complaint, my review of the speciﬁc eligibility dismissals
captured on Figure 1 below suggests that most of those dismissals are with prejudice—
they are, in other words, the ﬁnal word on patent validity as far as the district court is
concerned.264 Because the dismissal is for the legal insufﬁciency of the complaint, not
its factual insufﬁciency, ﬁling an amended complaint would do the patentee no good.265
Figure 1. Pleadings-Stage Eligibility Dismissals

264. See, e.g., Bascom Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 107 F. Supp. 3d 639, 655
(N.D. Tex. 2015) (granting motion to dismiss on eligibility grounds without offering the plaintiff an
opportunity to amend the complaint), vacated and remanded, 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
265. The data used to create Figure 1 cover all federal district courts nationwide and are drawn from
Docket Navigator’s motion success tool. See DOCKET NAVIGATOR, http://home.docketnavigator.com.
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Many observers have viewed the Supreme Court’s invigoration of the eligibil
ity requirement as problematic because, in their view, the requirement, which
demands that patents contain an “inventive concept,” has no policy justiﬁcation
that is independent from the other requirements of patentability.266 As the
Supreme Court has acknowledged, there will sometimes be “overlap” in analyz
ing whether a claim contains an inventive concept and whether it satisﬁes the
novelty and nonobviousness requirements.267 In addition, the Court’s concern
about the availability of “building blocks” can be read as condemning claims
that are overly broad268—highly similar to the animating policy of section 112’s
enablement requirement, which requires the patent to disclose sufﬁciently de
tailed information to allow a person of ordinary skill in the art to recreate the
invention without undue experimentation.269 The bar on patenting abstract ideas
also looks similar to the speciﬁc utility requirement, which ensures that a patent
“is not so vague as to be meaningless,”270 section 112’s deﬁniteness require
ment, which ensures that the public has reasonably certain notice of the patent’s
boundaries,271 and the written description doctrine, which ensures that the
patentee has described the invention with particularity.272

I obtained the data by running the following search: (1) Type of court document: motion to dismiss—
failure to state a claim OR motion for judgment on the pleadings; (2) Order ﬁled date: January 1, 2010,
to December 31, 2016, inclusive; (3) Legal issue: Unpatentable subject matter (35 U.S.C. § 101) and
selected subcategories, including patent ineligible subject matter (and all of its subcategories), inventive
concept, and preemption. Though more elaborate empirical work could certainly be done with regard to
district courts’ practices on eligibility, I offer this chart mainly to conﬁrm what patent lawyers and
scholars intuitively know: pleading-stage eligibility dismissals, which were nearly unheard of less than
a decade ago, are now a common occurrence in patent litigation. For further conﬁrmation of this trend,
see Jeffrey A. Lefstin et al., Final Report of the Berkeley Center for Law & Technology Section 101
Workshop: Addressing Patent Eligibility Challenges, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (forthcoming 2018)
(manuscript at 23 tbl. 2), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3050093 [https://perma.cc/K6A5-QDHA] (report
ing that, from June 2012 to February 2017, 69.4% of district court decisions on eligibility (249 of 359)
were made on a motion to dismiss or for judgment on the pleadings and that 63.1% of those
pleadings-stage decisions (157 of 249) invalidated the patent).
266. See J. Jonas Anderson, Applying Patent-Eligible Subject Matter Restrictions, 17 VAND. J. ENT.
& TECH. L. 267, 281 (2015) (summarizing commentary).
267. Mayo, 566 U.S. at 90.
268. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Wisdom of the Ages or Dead-Hand Control? Patentable Subject Matter
for Diagnostic Methods After In re Bilski, 3 CASE W. RES. J.L. TECH. & INTERNET 1, 56–59 (2012).
269. Consol. Elec. Light Co. v. McKeesport Light Co, 159 U.S. 465, 475 (1895).
270. In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The speciﬁc utility requirement can be
contrasted with the practical utility requirement, which ensures “that an invention is useful to the
public as disclosed in its current form, not that it may prove useful at some future date after further
research.” Id. The utility requirements, like the eligibility requirement, stem from section 101 of the
Patent Act, which permits patents on “new and useful” processes, machines, and so on. 35 U.S.C. § 101
(2012) (emphasis added).
271. See Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2129 (2014); see also 35 U.S.C.
§ 112(b) (requiring the patent to contain “one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly
claiming” the invention).
272. See Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1169 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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None of those requirements, however, are susceptible to quick resolution
because they all turn on questions of fact.273 Issues of fact can of course be
resolved on summary judgment if there is no genuine dispute between the
parties.274 But summary judgment in discovery-intensive patent cases is much
more expensive than a motion to dismiss. Thus, one arguably coherent policy
justiﬁcation for the eligibility requirement is that, as a “coarse-grained ﬁlter” for
patentability,275 it provides a means for quickly and cheaply wiping out patents
that are so likely to be invalidated under other requirements of patentability that
discovery is not warranted.276
The litigation cost savings that ﬂow from early resolution of validity via the
eligibility requirement may, however, come at the price of decreased accu
racy.277 Speciﬁcally, courts may be using the eligibility requirement to invali
date meritorious inventions. The Federal Circuit’s 2015 decision in Ariosa
Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc.278 is widely considered to be the paradig
matic example.279 In Ariosa, the Federal Circuit invalidated a patent on methods
of detecting fetal DNA that ﬂoats freely in the mother’s body.280 The discovery

273. See supra notes 132–41 and accompanying text; see also Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
598 F.3d 1336, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (stating that written description is a question of fact).
Given that the written description requirement hinges on documentary evidence, namely, a comparison
of the inventor’s original disclosure to the issued claims, one might reasonably question whether that
requirement truly presents a factual issue. See Jesse S. Keene, Fact or Fiction: Reexamining the Written
Description Doctrine’s Classiﬁcation as a Question of Fact, 18 FED. CIR. B.J. 25, 59–60 (2009).
274. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).
275. John M. Golden, Patentable Subject Matter and Institutional Choice, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1041,
1058 (2011); see also Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 722 F.3d 1335, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“[T]he
categories of patent-eligible subject matter are no more than a ‘coarse eligibility ﬁlter.’ In other
words, . . . the expansive categories—process, machine, article of manufacture, and composition of
matter—are not substitutes for the substantive patentability requirements set forth in §§ 102, 103, and
112 and invoked expressly by § 101 itself.” (citing Research Corp. Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 627
F.3d 859, 869 (Fed. Cir. 2010))), cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom. WildTangent, Inc. v.
Ultramercial, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 2870 (2014).
276. In contrast to this justiﬁcation grounded in considerations of timing and litigation-related costs,
other scholars have attempted to justify eligibility’s redundancy of other patentability requirements on
substantive grounds. John Golden, for example, has argued that redundancy can prevent patent drafters
from exploiting gaps left by other, compartmentalized doctrines of patentability. John M. Golden,
Redundancy: When Law Repeats Itself, 94 TEX. L. REV. 629, 710–11 (2016). Similarly, Kevin Collins
has argued that eligibility can limit the scope of patent protection in technologies where other validity
doctrines impose minimal restrictions. Kevin Emerson Collins, Patent-Ineligibility as Counteraction,
94 WASH. U. L. REV. 955, 1002, 1019 (2017) (providing the example of medical diagnostics, which, in
his view, inherently involve newly created knowledge that satisﬁes the novelty and nonobviousness
requirements).
277. For an argument questioning whether judges are capable of making “cheap and accurate”
assessments of eligibility on the limited record that is usually available early in the case, see Andres
Sawicki, The Central Claiming Renaissance, 103 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at
4), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2968650 [https://perma.cc/8RL9-6LKS].
278. 788 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
279. See, e.g., Dmitry Karshtedt, Photocopies, Patents, and Knowledge Transfer: “The Uneasy
Case” of Justice Breyer’s Patentable Subject Matter Jurisprudence, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1739, 1770–71
(2016).
280. 788 F.3d at 1373.
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of this cell-free fetal DNA (cffDNA) was an important breakthrough. Previously, fetal
genetic testing could be conducted only by extracting a sample directly from the
fetus—an expensive and risky procedure.281 Yet the Federal Circuit invalidated
Sequenom’s patent because cffDNA occurs naturally and the techniques for detecting
and amplifying it were well known at the time of the invention.282
Related to concerns about the invalidation of meritorious inventions is the
claim that the Supreme Court’s test for eligibility, which turns on the existence
of “abstract ideas,” “natural laws,” and “inventive concepts,” is so amorphous
that lower courts’ application of the doctrine is confused and unpredictable.283
One district judge deciding a patent eligibility issue invoked Justice Stewart’s
famous aphorism for identifying obscenity: “I know it when I see it.”284
It is certainly plausible that overzealous invalidations are deterring innovation
in areas such as medical diagnostics.285 And I have no doubt that any decent
patent lawyer (or law professor) can look at any two eligibility decisions and
argue that they are inconsistent. For instance, in Rapid Litigation Management
Ltd. v. CellzDirect, Inc., a case decided mere days after the Supreme Court
denied certiorari in Ariosa, the Federal Circuit upheld the eligibility of a patent
on a method of preserving hepatocytes (a type of liver cell).286 The court
distinguished Ariosa on the ground that the patent in Ariosa claimed a method
of “identifying” cffDNA, which, in the court’s view, amounted to “merely
claiming the natural phenomen[on] itself.”287 Yet the patent in CellzDirect
turned on the discovery that hepatocytes could survive multiple freeze-thaw
cycles—a natural trait of the cells.288 Thus, one could argue that the patent in
CellzDirect, just like the patent in Ariosa, simply claimed a natural phenom
enon. The court in CellzDirect, however, pointed out that the patent claimed a
new, physical method of preservation, not merely observation.289
Although these critiques of eligibility doctrine have merit, concerns about
poor-quality patents—and about how patentees use them—have merit, too.
Before the Supreme Court strengthened the eligibility requirement, there was
281. Rachel Rebouché, Testing Sex, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 519, 527 (2015).
282. Ariosa, 788 F.3d at 1376–77. It should be noted that Ariosa was resolved on summary
judgment, not the pleadings. But the complaint in that case was ﬁled in 2011—before the Supreme
Court’s decision in Mayo, which suggested that many medical diagnostics were not patent eligible.
Complaint at 6, Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 19 F. Supp. 3d 938 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (No.
3:11-cv-6391). Perhaps for that reason, Ariosa’s original declaratory judgment complaint sought only a
ruling of noninfringement, not invalidity. See id.
283. See Christopher M. Holman, Patent Eligibility Post-Myriad: A Reinvigorated Judicial Wildcard
of Uncertain Effect, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1796, 1798–1801 (2014); David O. Taylor, Confusing
Patent Eligibility, 84 TENN. L. REV. 157, 158–61 (2016).
284. Eclipse IP LLC v. McKinley Equip. Corp., No. SACV 14-154, 2014 WL 4407592, at *3 (C.D.
Cal. Sept. 4, 2014) (quoting Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
285. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Diagnostics Need Not Apply, 21 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 256, 256–57
(2015).
286. 827 F.3d 1042, 1044, 1050–51 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
287. Id. at 1048.
288. Id. at 1045, 1048.
289. Id. at 1048, 1050–52.
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effectively no way for accused infringers to seek dismissal on the merits before
discovery began. Thus, eligibility doctrine, though it may not be substantively
perfect, ﬁlls an important procedural gap by providing a mechanism to quickly
and cheaply invalidate patents that are clearly invalid.290 Rather than abolishing
the eligibility requirement, as some have suggested,291 or requiring courts to
avoid deciding eligibility issues until they have resolved all other grounds of
patentability, as others have proposed,292 we might consider ways to increase
the accuracy of eligibility rulings while preserving courts’ discretion to invoke
this cost-saving mechanism in appropriate cases.
One potential inﬁrmity with current eligibility law is its form. It is very much
a fuzzy standard, not a clear rule. Standards can be more costly to enforce than
rules and less predictable in application.293 This uncertainty may be exacerbated
in patent law, where the ambiguous standard of eligibility has been piled atop
the amorphous standard of nonobviousness—a multi-faceted, case-speciﬁc in
quiry into the prior art, differences between that prior art and the invention, the
level of ordinary skill in the art, and other considerations about market demand,
commercial success, failure of others, and “common sense.”294 If the law of
eligibility were made more rule-like, patentability would be resolved through a
series of successive tests that are each more fact-intensive than the one before it.
Clear, categorical exclusions from patent eligibility could be resolved on the
pleadings or a very early summary judgment motion. More fact-driven validity
doctrines, such as nonobviousness and the disclosure doctrines, could then

290. Invoking terminology used by Bob Bone, one might view this approach to eligibility as a
“thick” screening model, in which pleading-stage dismissals target not just objectively frivolous suits
(as a “thin” screening model would, see infra note 349), but also suits that are very weak. See Robert G.
Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A Comment on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 849, 870 (2010). Bone is ultimately skeptical of thick screening, arguing that a better way to
balance the costs and beneﬁts of early dismissal would be to engage in thin screening at the pleading
stage followed by limited discovery before more aggressive screening of the merits of the plaintiff’s
claim. Id. at 881. In a similar vein, I suggest below that courts might reconceive patent eligibility as a
question of law based on narrowly deﬁned factual inquiries to reduce the risk that meritorious claims
will be erroneously dismissed on a limited factual record. See infra note 311 and accompanying text.
291. See supra note 19.
292. See, e.g., MySpace, Inc. v. GraphOn Corp., 672 F.3d 1250, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[C]ourts
should avoid reaching for interpretations of broad provisions, such as § 101, when more speciﬁc
statutes, such as §§ 102, 103, and 112, can decide the case.”); Dennis Crouch & Robert P. Merges,
Operating Efﬁciently Post-Bilski by Ordering Patent Doctrine Decision-Making, 25 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1673, 1678 (2010). But see, e.g., Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307,
1324 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Mayer, J., concurring) (“[S]ection 101 imposes a threshold test, one that must be
satisﬁed before a court can proceed to consider subordinate validity issues such as non-obvious
ness . . . or adequate written description . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
293. Cf. Kaplow, supra note 144, at 577, 596 (noting that rules are not always simpler to apply than
standards). With regard to patent eligibility, the difﬁculty with a standard-like test may be particularly
acute in the examination process. See Greg Reilly, Decoupling Patent Law, 97 B.U. L. REV. 551, 592
(2017) (“[T]he Supreme Court identiﬁes an ‘abstract idea’ largely by analogizing (and distinguishing)
prior precedent. This is feasible for judges, who are trained and experienced at common law reasoning,
but . . . both foreign to, and difﬁcult for, nonlawyer patent examiners.” (footnotes omitted)).
294. See Golden, supra note 276, at 701–02.
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remain in their current, standard-like forms and be resolved on summary
judgment at the close of discovery or at trial.295
But the value of doctrinal clarity in facilitating quick and accurate decisions
on eligibility does not mean that legislative intervention is warranted.296 It is not
unusual for common law doctrines, which patent eligibility effectively is, to
crystalize into rules over time.297 Recent decisions by the Federal Circuit
provide at least some reason to think that the law of eligibility could, over time,
assume a more a rule-like form that is more predictable in application. For
instance, in contrast to the Supreme Court’s decisions in Bilski v. Kappos and
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International, the Federal Circuit has issued several
opinions upholding software-related patents against eligibility challenges. The
Federal Circuit’s case law conﬁrms what the Supreme Court suggested in Alice:
traditional business techniques implemented on a generic computer are not
eligible for patenting.298 But software-related inventions are patent eligible if
they improve the function of a computer,299 solve a problem unique to the
Internet,300 or implement an arguably abstract idea in a very speciﬁc way.301

295. For a similar proposal to reform trademark fair use doctrine, see McGeveran, Trademark Fair
Use Reform, supra note 46, at 2299 (“Under the proposal, trademark cases that raise free speech issues
would move through a sequence of successively more complicated tests . . . . Each test . . . imposes
greater administrative costs to adjudicate. Each one moves further along the spectrum from rules to
standards. . . . [T]he ﬁrst and simplest [test] is a categorical exclusion . . . . Expressive uses [of a
trademark] that meet the conditions of an exclusion are exempt from liability, without any further
inquiry into the likelihood of consumer confusion. Cases that fall outside these deﬁned categories
would remain eligible for the existing trademark fair use doctrines and presumably for standards-based
reforms that other scholars have suggested. Finally, courts would evaluate the remaining cases . . . un
der the likelihood of confusion test.”).
296. Cf. David O. Taylor, Amending Patent Eligibility, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2149, 2151–52 (2017)
(arguing that Congress should amend section 101).
297. See McGeveran, Trademark Fair Use Reform, supra note 46, at 2288; see also Keith N.
Hylton, Patent Uncertainty: Toward a Framework with Applications, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1117, 1148
(2016) (noting that the “inherent uncertainty” stemming from the Supreme Court’s recent eligibility
decisions “does not need to be a focus of [law] reform, because the common law process is necessarily
uncertain at an early stage of analysis of a particular class of legal claims”).
298. See, e.g., OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(invalidating a patent describing “the automation of the fundamental economic concept of offer-based
price optimization through the use of generic-computer functions”); see also Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank
Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2359 (2014) (observing that the patents in suit did “not . . . purport to improve
the functioning of the computer itself or effect an improvement in any other technology or technical
ﬁeld”).
299. See, e.g., Enﬁsh, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1336, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(upholding the eligibility of a patent on a “self-referential table for a computer database,” noting it is “a
speciﬁc type of data structure designed to improve the way a computer stores and retrieves data in
memory”).
300. See, e.g., DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1257–59 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(upholding the eligibility of a patent on an invention that addressed the problem of retaining website
visitors upon the click of an advertising link, noting that “the claimed solution is necessarily rooted in
computer technology in order to overcome a problem speciﬁcally arising in the realm of computer
networks”).
301. See, e.g., Bascom Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1350–52
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (upholding the eligibility of a patent on ﬁltering Internet content where the patent
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Although not every Federal Circuit eligibility decision is amenable to easy
characterization,302 much of the court’s case law can be understood to embrace
a “technological arts” test, under which “advances in non-technological
disciplines, such as business, law, or the social sciences,” are not patent
eligible.303 On the other hand, patents covering technological improvements in
computer hardware or software—particularly those that improve the functioning
of the computer or that solve a problem unique to the realm of computers or the
Internet—are patent eligible.304 Likewise, in the realm of biotechnology, one
could plausibly reconcile the decisions in Ariosa and CellzDirect by noting that
inventions are not patent eligible if they cover the mere isolation or detection of
a naturally occurring chemical but that they are patent eligible if they entail the
making of a new thing or the creation of a new, physical process.305
Another potential critique of current eligibility law, despite the doctrine’s
ability to facilitate quick decisions on patent validity, is that the Supreme
Court’s run of opinions consistently ruling against the patentee has incentivized
too many pleading-stage eligibility motions. If many of those motions lack
merit, the invigorated eligibility requirement could, as a systemic matter, be
creating more litigation without providing earlier or cheaper resolution. As
required the ﬁlter to be located on a remote server and required the ﬁlter to allow customization by
users); see also McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir.
2016) (ﬁnding not to be an abstract idea claims on a process for synchronizing animation with sound,
noting that the process “uses a combined order of speciﬁc rules that renders information into a speciﬁc
format”).
302. For instance, the court recently held patent eligible some rather vague claims to a computer
program for processing network usage information, relying heavily on the speciﬁcation to ﬁnd
non-generic aspects of the invention. See Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288,
1299–1307 (Fed. Cir. 2016). This reliance on the speciﬁcation prompted a vigorous dissent from Judge
Reyna, who asserted that the majority’s holding “contravenes the fundamental [principle] that the
section 101 inquiry is about whether the claims are directed to a patent-eligible invention, not whether
the speciﬁcation is so directed.” Id. at 1307 (Reyna, J., dissenting). An intracircuit split appears to be
percolating on the relevance of the speciﬁcation—if any—to the eligibility analysis. See Two-Way
Media Ltd. v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC, 874 F.3d 1329, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“The main
problem that [the patentee] cannot overcome is that the claim—as opposed to something purportedly
described in the speciﬁcation—is missing an inventive concept.”).
303. Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 721 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (Mayer, J., concurring) (“A
rule holding that claims are impermissibly abstract if they are directed to an entrepreneurial objective,
such as methods for increasing revenue, minimizing economic risk, or structuring commercial transac
tions, rather than a technological one, would comport with the guidance provided in both Alice and
Bilski.”); see Joshua L. Sohn, A Defense of the Current Jurisprudence on Section 101, LAW360 (Oct. 7,
2016, 9:53 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/846930/a-defense-of-the-current-jurisprudence-on
section-101 [https://perma.cc/U57P-5MSX] (“[T]he Federal Circuit has consistently invalidated patent
claims that simply apply economic, business, or human-interaction practices on a computer without
improving the computer itself or any other technological art.”).
304. See Matt Levy, Software Patents Will Survive: How Section 101 Law Is Settling Down,
IPWATCHDOG (Nov. 30, 2016), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2016/11/30/software-patents-will-survive/id=
75101 [https://perma.cc/T7HC-9ZQL] (noting that a claim is patent eligible under recent Federal
Circuit case law if it is “a technical improvement to a technical problem”).
305. See Paul R. Gugliuzza & Mark A. Lemley, Can a Court Change the Law by Saying Nothing?,
71 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 14–15), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3015459 [https://
perma.cc/6FB6-37C9].
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discussed above, the number of pleading-stage dismissals on eligibility grounds
has increased in recent years. But, as Figure 2 below illustrates, the percentage
of motions that have been granted (in whole or in part) has begun to fall.306
Figure 2. Pleading-Stage Eligibility Motion Grant Rates

The falling grant rate could be interpreted to suggest that weaker motions are
now being ﬁled. A few words of caution, however. First, the population size is
small. In 2016, district courts decided 149 pleading-stage eligibility motions, up
from 101 in 2015, 24 in 2014, and 11 in 2013. Similarly, the timeframe is
limited, meaning that any claims about trends should be made carefully. Finally,
although the grant rate appears to be falling, in 2016 it was about 50%, which
would be consistent with litigants adjusting to the new test for eligibility and
decisions coalescing around the 50% win-rate predicted by the Priest–Klein
hypothesis.307
In any event, the process of resolving patent eligibility could be improved in
various ways that would enhance accuracy without eliminating the cost savings

306. I obtained this data by running the same search described above in Docket Navigator’s motion
success tool. See supra note 265.
307. George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD.
1, 5 (1984). The validity of that hypothesis has, of course, been questioned and critiqued. See, e.g.,
Keith N. Hylton, Asymmetric Information and the Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 22 J. LEGAL
STUD. 187, 188 (1993) (citing literature and presenting an extension of the Priest–Klein hypothesis that
incorporates considerations about the information available to the parties and its legal relevance).
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quick decisions can provide.308 Most fundamentally, courts should carefully
consider whether the eligibility inquiry truly presents a question of law that can
be resolved on the pleadings. The test for eligibility developed by the Supreme
Court suggests that factﬁnding can at least sometimes be necessary. In Alice and
Bilski, for example, the Court ruled that the patents claimed abstract ideas
because they involved the “fundamental economic practice[s]” of intermediated
settlement and risk hedging, respectively.309 And in Mayo the Court invalidated
patents on medical diagnostic tests because they claimed “well-understood,
routine, conventional activity already engaged in by the scientiﬁc commu
nity.”310 Determining the prevailing practices of a particular community would
seem to be a factual inquiry, not a legal one.
Thus, a more coherent way forward would be for the Federal Circuit to
explicitly recognize the factual underpinnings of the eligibility analysis rather
than simply reciting that “[p]atent eligibility under [section] 101 is an issue of
law,” as the court has often done.311 In fact, some Federal Circuit case law
predating the recent resurgence of the eligibility requirement acknowledges the
factual components of the analysis.312 And, as this Article was going to press,
the Federal Circuit issued an opinion declaring rather emphatically that the
question under Mayo of whether claim elements are “conventional” is, indeed, a
question of fact.313
Under an approach treating eligibility as a question of law based on underly
ing questions of fact, dismissal on the pleadings would remain appropriate
when—as is not uncommon—the patent itself recites the prevailing practices
that provide the basis for the invalidity ruling314 or the relevant practices are a

308. I explore these possibilities in more detail in a forthcoming article, Paul R. Gugliuzza, The
Procedure of Patent Eligibility, 97 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming).
309. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2356 (2014); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593,
611 (2010).
310. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 79–80 (2012).
311. E.g., Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 850 F.3d 1332, 1338 (Fed. Cir.
2017).
312. See, e.g., Arrhythmia Research Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1056 (Fed. Cir.
1992) (stating that the eligibility analysis “may require ﬁndings of underlying facts speciﬁc to the
particular subject matter and its mode of claiming”); see also Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 722 F.3d
1335, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“[T]he analysis under § 101, while ultimately a legal determination, is rife
with underlying factual issues.”), cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom. WildTangent, Inc. v.
Ultramercial, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 2870 (2014).
313. Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2018); see also Aatrix Software, Inc. v.
Green Shades Software, Inc., No. 2017-1452, 2018 WL 843288, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 14, 2018)
(holding that factual allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint about the patent’s inventiveness required
the district court to deny a motion to dismiss on eligibility grounds).
314. In Mayo, for instance, the Court drew heavily from the patent’s speciﬁcation (the detailed
description of the invention that precedes the patent’s claims) to support its conclusion that the patent
did not contain the required inventive concept. See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 78–80. Note, however, that Mayo
was resolved on summary judgment, not the pleadings. Id. at 76. For an example of a Federal Circuit
opinion relying mainly on the speciﬁcation to afﬁrm a pleading-stage ruling of invalidity, see Intellec
tual Ventures I LLC v. Erie Indem. Co., 850 F.3d 1315, 1328–29 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
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matter of common knowledge.315 But explicitly acknowledging the factual
components of the eligibility analysis would nudge courts to more carefully
apply the Twombly and Iqbal framework. Rather than simply issuing a yes-or-no
decision on the patent’s validity, as sometimes seems to be the case,316 dismissal
would be appropriate only if, viewing the relevant facts in the light most
favorable to the patentee, there is no plausible case that the patent satisﬁes the
eligibility requirement. Where there is a plausible case for eligibility, the parties
would be allowed to develop and present to the court, perhaps via an early
summary judgment motion, evidence that would allow a more accurate compari
son of the patent’s claims to the prior art.
A more thorough application of Twombly and Iqbal would also ensure that
courts recognize the role of claim construction in the eligibility analysis. After
all, the ﬁrst step of the Alice test is determining whether the patent is “directed
to” an ineligible concept, such as a law of nature.317 Under Twombly and Iqbal,
dismissal on the pleadings would be appropriate only if—again viewing any
relevant facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff—there is no plausible
claim construction under which the patent would satisfy the eligibility test.318 In
addition, because eligibility is today widely considered to be a pure question of
law, district courts are deeply split on whether the presumption of validity
applies.319 Explicitly acknowledging the factual components of the eligibility
inquiry, as the Federal Circuit has at least begun to do,320 would make clear
that, for better or worse, the evidentiary presumption applies, just as it does to
the factual aspects of other validity requirements.321

315. See, e.g., Network Apparel Grp., LP v. Airwave Networks Inc., 154 F. Supp. 3d 467, 479–80 (W.D.
Tex. 2015) (ﬁnding the “practice of incentivizing an end user to acknowledge receipt of a message” to be “a
longstanding commercial practice” and noting that, “[i]n determining whether the purpose of a patent is
abstract, it is within the Court’s province to consider both the patent speciﬁcation and well-known, general
historical observations”), aff’d, 680 F. App’x 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2017); see also Cal. Inst. of Tech. v. Hughes
Commc’ns Inc., 59 F. Supp. 3d 974, 978 n.6 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (“Eligibility questions mostly involve general
historical observations, the sort of ﬁndings routinely made by courts deciding legal questions.”).
316. See, e.g., Afﬁnity Labs of Tex., LLC v. DirecTV, LLC, 109 F. Supp. 3d 916, 942 (W.D. Tex.
2015) (“[T]he Court ﬁnds as a matter of law that Claim 1 . . . does not contain an inventive concept in
that it does not add something to the abstract idea that is an ‘integral’ or ‘signiﬁcant part’ of the
invention.”), aff’d, 838 F.3d 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
317. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014).
318. See Saurabh Vishnubhakat, The Antitrusting of Patentability, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 71,
101–02 (2017) (suggesting that one way to increase accuracy in patent eligibility determinations
without unduly increasing process costs would be to require the patent owner to submit a proposed
claim construction “and to take that construction as true for purposes of the subject-matter eligibility
evaluation”). As I explain in a forthcoming paper, because the Federal Circuit usually treats claim
construction as a question of law, applying the plausibly standard to matters of claim construction could
require some adjustments to the law of claim construction itself, including a greater recognition that
fact questions are central to determining claim meaning. See Gugliuzza, supra note 308.
319. See Front Row Techs., LLC v. NBA Media Ventures, LLC, 204 F. Supp. 3d 1190, 1231–35
(D.N.M. 2016) (collecting conﬂicting authorities), aff’d, 697 F. App’x 701 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
320. See supra note 313.
321. See Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 114–15 (2011) (Breyer, J., concurring)
(describing how the presumption of validity applies to legal questions based on factual inquiries). As
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Regardless of eligibility doctrine’s potential to facilitate quick decisions,
skeptics may still view the Supreme Court’s recent decisions as misguided,
incoherent, and threatening incentives for innovation. Others might point out
that the new administrative proceedings created by the AIA largely address
concerns about the weak patents targeted by eligibility doctrine.322 I cannot
hope to respond to all possible critiques in this space. Rather, my aim has been
to contribute to the debate over patent eligibility by highlighting an important
but underappreciated beneﬁt of the doctrine: unlike any other requirement of
patentability, eligibility provides a mechanism to dismiss low-merit suits before
the parties incur signiﬁcant litigation costs.
3. Pleading Standards
A ﬁnal recent change in the law that has the potential to facilitate prediscovery
decisions in patent cases occurred when the Supreme Court deleted the form com
plaint for patent infringement from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. As the
Federal Circuit had explained, that form, Form 18, required a complaint for direct
infringement to contain merely an allegation of jurisdiction, a demand for relief, and
statements that the plaintiff owned the patent, the defendant had been infringing the
patent, and the plaintiff had given the defendant notice of its infringement.323 The
Federal Circuit also held that, because pleading direct infringement was speciﬁcally
governed by Form 18, Twombly and Iqbal did not apply.324 Thus, a patentee could
avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim without providing anything more than a
generic description of the allegedly infringing product or process.325 For that reason,
the administrative body charged with updating the rules singled out Form 18 as
particularly “inadequate” for modern litigation.326
When the Supreme Court deleted Form 18 from the Federal Rules, it also
deleted Rule 84, which stated that use of an appropriate form satisﬁed the

discussed above, there is a reasonable argument that the presumption of validity is unjustiﬁed as a
policy matter because of the limited scrutiny many patents receive during examination. See supra notes
217–18 and accompanying text. As also discussed, however, any move to eliminate that presumption
must come from Congress. i4i, 564 U.S. at 113–14 (majority opinion) (reafﬁrming that the presumption
requires a patent challenger to prove invalidity by clear and convincing evidence, noting that “[a]ny
recalibration of the standard of proof [in patent cases] remains in [Congress’s] hands”).
322. See 1 PETER S. MENELL ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 302 (2017).
323. In re Bill of Lading Transmission & Processing Sys. Patent Litig., 681 F.3d 1323, 1334 (Fed. Cir.
2012). There was no form complaint for claims of indirect (that is, induced or contributory) infringement, so
the amendments to the Federal Rules do not change the pleading standards in those cases. See id. at 1336–37.
324. Id. at 1334 (“[T]o the extent the parties argue that Twombly and its progeny conﬂict with the
Forms and create differing pleadings requirements, the Forms control.”).
325. See McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 501 F.3d 1354, 1357–58 (Fed. Cir. 2007); see also K–Tech.
Telecomms., Inc. v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 714 F.3d 1277, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“We do not read
Form 18 . . . to require that a plaintiff identify an accused device by name.”). Form 18’s model
allegation of infringement stated in relevant part: “[T]he defendant has infringed and is still infringing
the Letters Patent by making, selling, and using electric motors that embody the patented inven
tion . . . .” Id. at 1285 (emphasis added).
326. COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., PRELIMINARY
DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF BANKRUPTCY AND CIVIL PROCEDURE 276 (2013).
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requirements of the rules.327 Consequently, complaints for direct patent infringe
ment are now governed by the plausibility standard articulated in Twombly and
Iqbal.328 As applied to patent cases, that standard requires patent owners to include in
their complaint factual allegations that would allow a court to make a plausible
inference of infringement. Much as the invigorated eligibility requirement allows
courts to dismiss on the pleadings cases in which the patent is clearly invalid, this new
pleading standard allows courts to dismiss cases in which the defendant clearly does
not infringe. For example, in a recent case involving a patent that recited a “TV
Channel,” a magistrate judge recommended dismissal, with prejudice, because the
accused technology was Internet-based and there was “no plausible basis for alleging
that the plain and ordinary meaning of ‘TV Channel’ (or ‘TV Channel’ properly
construed) covers URLs, i.e., a unique address for a web page that makes content
addressable on the Internet.”329
Although the deletion of Form 18 facilitates quick decisions when the
allegations of infringement are plainly insufﬁcient, in closer cases it has caused
district courts to adopt widely varying pleading requirements.330 In contrast to
Form 18, many courts now require the complaint to contain allegations linking
the patent’s claims to the infringing features of the accused product or pro
cess.331 Under that view, merely identifying the patent and generally describing
the accused product or process is insufﬁcient.332 But courts have not been
consistent about the level of detail required. Some have required “factual
allegations that . . . permit [the] court to infer that the accused product infringes
each element of at least one claim.”333 Other courts have been more demanding,
requiring information about how the defendant infringes each asserted claim.334
At the other extreme, some courts, despite the deletion of Form 18, have
continued to absolve plaintiffs from identifying the claims of the patent they are

327. COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., supra note
15, at 28.
328. The Federal Circuit has not yet articulated what, exactly, the differences between Form 18 and
the Twombly/Iqbal standard might be, see Lifetime Indus., Inc. v. Trim-Lok, Inc., 869 F.3d 1372, 1377
(Fed. Cir. 2017), though there are many district court decisions on the issue, as discussed in this portion
of the Article. Somewhat remarkably, the Federal Circuit has left open the possibility that there is no
difference at all. See id. (“The parties assume that there is a difference between the requirements of
Form 18 and Iqbal/Twombly; however, we have never recognized such a distinction.”).
329. Bartonfalls LLC v. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., No. 2:16-cv-1127, 2017 WL 1375205, at *2 (E.D. Tex.
Mar. 15, 2017), report and recommendation adopted by 2017 WL 1319656 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 10, 2017).
330. See Oil-Dri Corp. of Am. v. Nestle Purina Petcare Co., No. 15-cv-1067, 2017 WL 1197096, at
*3–5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2017) (noting the split of authority); e.Digital Corp. v. iBaby Labs, Inc., No.
15-cv-0579, 2016 WL 4427209, at *3–4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2016) (same).
331. See, e.g., Atlas IP LLC v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., No. 15-cv-5469, 2016 WL 1719545, at *2
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2016).
332. See, e.g., Global Tech LED, LLC v. Every Watt Matters, LLC, No. 15-cv-61933, 2016 WL
6682015, at *2 (S.D. Fla. May 19, 2016).
333. E.g., Atlas IP, LLC v. Exelon Corp., 189 F. Supp. 3d 768, 775 (N.D. Ill. 2016), aff’d sub nom.
Atlas IP, LLC v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 686 F. App’x 921 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
334. E.g., Asghari–Kamrani v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, No. 2:15CV478, 2016 WL 1253533, at *4
(E.D. Va. Mar. 22, 2016).
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asserting.335 Many judges have emphasized that early deadlines in local proce
dural rules for disclosing infringement contentions mitigate any prejudice to a
defendant faced with a vague complaint for infringement.336 And one court has
held that compliance with Form 18 remains sufﬁcient in part because of an
advisory committee note stating that the abrogation of Rule 84 and the deletion
of the forms “does not alter existing pleading standards.”337
Thus, although the deletion of Form 18 would appear to facilitate quick
decisions of noninfringement, it may actually have encouraged additional litiga
tion over the substance of the pleading standard and whether the plaintiff in a
particular case has satisﬁed it.338 Even in the courts that have imposed a more
onerous standard, most dismissals have been without prejudice, meaning that
the patentee has been given the opportunity to ﬁle an amended complaint. Cases
dismissing infringement complaints with prejudice remain the exception, not
the rule.339 When with-prejudice dismissals do occur, the plaintiff has typically
had one or more chances to amend the complaint340 or has waived the opportu
nity to amend.341

335. E.g., Iron Gate Sec., Inc. v. Lowe’s Cos., No. 15-cv-8814, 2016 WL 1070853, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 16, 2016).
336. E.g., Solocron Educ., LLC v. Healthstream, Inc., No. 2:16-cv-16, 2016 WL 9137458, at *3 (E.D. Tex.
June 7, 2016); Avago Techs. Gen. IP (Singapore) PTE Ltd. v. Asustek Comput., Inc., No. 15-cv-04525, 2016
WL 1623920, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2016). Several district courts have ﬂatly disagreed with that position.
E.g., CG Tech. Dev., LLC v. FanDuel, Inc., No. 2:16-cv-00801, 2017 WL 58572, at *4 (D. Nev. Jan. 4, 2017)
(“The requirement of providing infringement contentions element-by-element under the Local Rules does not
permit a more ﬂexible application of Civil Rule 8(a) at the dismissal stage.”).
337. Hologram USA, Inc. v. Pulse Evolution Corp., No. 2:14-CV-0772, 2016 WL 199417, at *2 n.1
(D. Nev. Jan. 15, 2016). As noted, the Federal Circuit has similarly left open the possibility that
compliance with Form 18 remains sufﬁcient to avoid a motion to dismiss. See supra note 328. For a
scholarly argument that the deletion of the forms “cannot fairly be read as an invitation to make
pleading standards more restrictive,” see Adam M. Steinman, The End of an Era? Federal Civil
Procedure After the 2015 Amendments, 66 EMORY L.J. 1, 41 (2016).
338. Cf. Hillel Y. Levin, Iqbal, Twombly, and the Lessons of the Celotex Trilogy, 14 LEWIS & CLARK
L. REV. 143, 155 (2010) (suggesting that Iqbal and Twombly have had a similar effect on civil litigation
more generally).
339. In a thorough search, I have been able to locate six decisions in 2016 (out of eighteen granted motions
to dismiss) in which a court dismissed claims with prejudice for insufﬁciently alleging direct infringement, and
two of those with-prejudice dismissals were reversed on appeal. See Lifetime Indus., Inc. v. Trim-Lok, Inc., No.
3:13-cv-819, 2016 WL 5724451, at *5 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 30, 2016), rev’d, 869 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2017);
Howard v. Ford Motor Co., No. 1:16CV127, 2016 WL 4077260, at *5 (S.D. Miss. July 29, 2016); Nu-You
Techs., LLC v. Beauty Town Int’l Inc., No. 3:15-CV-3433, 2016 WL 4717991, at *3 (N.D. Tex. July 7, 2016);
Ruby Sands LLC v. Am. Nat’l Bank of Tex., No. 2:15-cv-1955, 2016 WL 3542430, at *5 (E.D. Tex. June 28,
2016); Atlas IP, LLC v. Exelon Corp., 189 F. Supp. 3d 768, 779 (N.D. Ill. 2016), aff’d sub nom. Atlas IP, LLC
v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 686 F. App’x 921 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Nalco Co. v. Chem–Mod, LLC, No.
14-cv-2510, 2016 WL 1594966, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 20, 2016), rev’d, No. 2017-1036, 2018 WL 1055851 (Fed.
Cir. Feb. 27, 2018). In a few additional cases, the dismissal was not explicitly with prejudice, but the district
court litigation concluded shortly after the dismissal. See, e.g., Disc Disease Sols,, Inc. v. VGH Sols., Inc., No.
1:15-cv-188, 2016 WL 6561566, at *3 (M.D. Ga. Nov. 2, 2016), appeal ﬁled, No. 2017-1483 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 17,
2017).
340. See, e.g., Lifetime Indus., 2016 WL 5724451, at *1; Nalco, 2016 WL 1594966, at *1; Atlas IP,
189 F. Supp. 3d at 773.
341. See, e.g., Nu-You, 2016 WL 4717991, at *1.
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It is therefore possible that the deletion of Form 18 has actually increased
process costs—by incentivizing defendants to ﬁle motions they would not have
previously ﬁled and by requiring plaintiffs to engage in additional fact gathering
and pleading—without concluding cases any more quickly or accurately. As
Figure 3 below illustrates, the number of district court decisions on motions to
dismiss direct infringement claims ticked up signiﬁcantly in 2016, the ﬁrst full
year without Form 18, but grant rates slightly declined.342 (Note that Figure 3
includes only motions to dismiss based on the insufﬁciency of direct infringe
ment allegations.343 Motions to dismiss based on eligibility grounds, the topics
of Figures 1 and 2, are excluded.) Again, however, it is worth noting that the
population size is small and the timeframe is limited, so we should be cautious
about drawing conclusions about any trends being illustrated.
Figure 3. Motions to Dismiss Direct Infringement Claims

342. In a similar vein, many empirical studies of Twombly and Iqbal have found no statistically
signiﬁcant change in the proportion of cases granting motions to dismiss with prejudice, though it is of
course possible that parties have changed their behavior in light of the changed pleading standards. See
Jonah B. Gelbach, Locking the Doors to Discovery? Assessing the Effects of Twombly and Iqbal on
Access to Discovery, 121 YALE L.J. 2270, 2306 (2012); see also William H.J. Hubbard, The Empirical
Effects of Twombly and Iqbal 6–7 (Coase-Sandor Inst. for Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 774, Aug.
2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2820300 [https://perma.cc/V94K-D7HW] (collecting empirical stud
ies on the effects of Twombly and Iqbal).
343. To obtain the data, I again used Docket Navigator’s motion success tool, see supra note 265,
running the following search: (1) Type of court document: motion to dismiss—failure to state a claim;
(2) Order ﬁled date: January 1, 2013 to December 31, 2016, inclusive; (3) Legal issue: direct
infringement (and all subcategories).
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One important step in leveraging the deletion of Form 18 to reduce litigation
costs would be for the Federal Circuit to provide clarity on what, exactly,
plaintiffs must allege in their complaints about the defendant’s infringement.
Although some Federal Circuit judges have recognized the difﬁculty of assess
ing infringement at the pleadings stage,344 the court has thus far declined to
elaborate on the post-Form 18 pleading standard.345 Under Twombly and Iqbal,
a patentee must plead facts that would plausibly establish a claim under the
relevant substantive law. To prove a claim of direct patent infringement, a
patentee must demonstrate the presence of each element of the patent claim or
each element’s equivalent in the accused product or process.346 Taking those
legal principles as given, it would seem that a complaint for direct infringement
should, at minimum, identify the patent claims being asserted, identify the
accused product or process, and provide a description of how the accused
product or process meets the patent’s claim limitations.347
That may seem like too much detail to demand in a pleading. Civil procedure
scholars have criticized Twombly and Iqbal for precisely that reason.348 Yet, in
many patent cases (unlike, say, civil rights cases), the information the plaintiff
must plead is not exclusively in the possession of the defendant. Often, the
defendant sells an allegedly infringing product that the plaintiff can purchase,
describe, and compare its patent claims to in the complaint. Because asymmet
ric information is not a major concern in patent cases, the risk of erroneous
dismissal from stricter screening does not seem terribly high. Indeed, cases such
as the “TV Channel” case discussed above appear to involve infringement
claims that objectively lack merit.349 And because dismissal on the pleadings is

344. See Jimmy Hoover, ComEd Appeal ‘Pain in the Ass,’ Fed. Cir. Judge Says, LAW360 (Mar. 9,
2017, 8:45 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/900177/comed-appeal-pain-in-the-ass-fed-circ-judge
says [https://perma.cc/4G9Z-LQJD] (describing oral argument in Atlas IP, LLC v. Commonwealth
Edison Co., in which Judge Moore “expressed frustration that her three-judge panel had to sift through
in-depth claim construction issues . . . when the lower court never ruled on those issues”).
345. See Atlas IP, LLC v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 686 F. App’x 921, 922 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
(afﬁrming a dismissal with prejudice for failure to adequately allege direct infringement but providing
no substantive analysis of the complaint); Lifetime Indus., Inc. v. Trim-Lok, Inc., 869 F.3d 1372, 1377
(Fed. Cir. 2017) (reversing a dismissal with prejudice for failure to adequately allege direct infringe
ment, noting that “we need not resolve the question whether there is a difference between [the Form 18
and Twombly/Iqbal] standards here because, as we explain, the [complaint] met the Iqbal/Twombly
standard for pleading direct infringement”).
346. Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
347. For a more general exploration of how, after Twombly and Iqbal, the speciﬁcity required in a
complaint may turn on “the substantive contours of the plaintiff’s claim,” see Adam N. Steinman, The
Rise and Fall of Plausibility Pleading?, 69 VAND. L. REV. 333, 383 (2016).
348. See David Freeman Engstrom, The Twiqbal Puzzle and Empirical Study of Civil Procedure, 65
STAN. L. REV. 1203, 1204 n.6 (2013) (collecting commentary).
349. In contrast with the “thick” screening that would allow for dismissal of claims that are weak but
not frivolous, Bob Bone has termed this type of screening “thin” screening, which allows dismissal
when “liability turns on objective facts about the defendant’s conduct and the defendant in fact did not
act in the required way.” See Bone, supra note 290, at 870; see also Robert G. Bone, Twombly,
Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of Court Access, 94 IOWA L. REV. 873, 900 (2009) (exploring the
potential normative justiﬁcations for a thin screening approach).
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usually without prejudice, the patentee will receive multiple opportunities to
adequately allege infringement. Patentees who cannot do so after multiple tries
would seem to be those with the least meritorious claims in the ﬁrst place.
To be sure, over the long term, if courts grant motions to dismiss too
enthusiastically, weakened patent rights could harm innovation incentives. So it
is important to recognize that Twombly and Iqbal give district judges substantial
discretion in reviewing the sufﬁciency of complaints.350 It may be appropriate
for courts to demand less detail in complaints in biotechnology cases, for
instance, where patent infringement often occurs in research or production
facilities to which a patentee does not have access. By contrast, more detailed
pleadings may be called for when dealing with multi-component electronics. In
those cases, the product is usually available for purchase and inspection, and a
manufacturer accused of infringement needs to know exactly which aspect of its
product is alleged to infringe so it can immediately involve the correct supplier
in the litigation. In the rarer cases where particular information about the
accused product or process is potentially dispositive but exclusively in the
defendant’s possession, courts could use their discretion to order limited, plead
ings-stage discovery.351 Lastly, courts can reduce pleadings-stage process costs
by allowing the patentee to clarify its infringement allegations through brieﬁng
on the motion to dismiss rather than formalistically demanding that the patentee
amend and reﬁle its complaint.352
In sum, unlike AIA proceedings and the invigorated eligibility requirement,
which have indisputably facilitated quicker decisions, the deletion of Form 18
seems to present merely the potential for quick decisions. It may in fact have
thus far had the paradoxical effect of increasing litigation costs and slowing
cases down. The deletion of that form, however, could certainly be leveraged to
render speedier—but still accurate—decisions in cases in which the patent
owner’s claim of infringement plainly lacks merit.
B. OTHER TYPES OF QUICK DECISIONS

To this point, I have focused on changes in the law that allow patent suits to
be resolved before discovery begins because that is the point at which litigation
expenses begin to escalate signiﬁcantly. But several other recent developments
in patent law allow cases to be resolved earlier in the dispute process, even if
they do not enable the parties to avoid discovery altogether.

350. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (“Determining whether a complaint states
a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-speciﬁc task that requires the reviewing court to draw
on its judicial experience and common sense.”).
351. See Suzette M. Malveaux, Front Loading and Heavy Lifting: How Pre-Dismissal Discovery
Can Address the Detrimental Effect of Iqbal on Civil Rights Cases, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 65, 69
(2010).
352. See, e.g., Danfoss Power Sols. Inc. v. DeltaTech Controls, No. 16-CV-3111, slip op. at 1–2 (D.
Minn. Mar. 7, 2017).
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1. Claim Construction
Although it is now two decades old, the Supreme Court’s seminal decision in
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. facilitates quicker decisions by mandat
ing that the judge, not the jury, interpret the claims of the patent.353 A jury could
not issue its view of the meaning of the patent’s claims until after trial, but
judges can—and usually do—decide claim construction before trial, typically
during or at the close of discovery. Judicial claim construction often leads
directly to summary judgment, particularly on the issue of infringement when
there is no dispute about the nature or operation of the accused infringer’s
product or process.354
Even today, Markman continues to open new avenues of quick resolution.
For instance, in a 2014 decision, Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., the
Supreme Court reversed the Federal Circuit’s stringent test for showing that a
patent is invalid as indeﬁnite.355 Indeﬁniteness is a matter of claim construction,
so Nautilus, coupled with Markman, should facilitate quicker judicial decisions
of indeﬁniteness.356
The Federal Circuit’s 2015 en banc ruling on functional claiming, Williamson
v. Citrix Online, LLC, also facilitates quicker, case-dispositive decisions on
matters related to claim construction.357 At issue in that case was section 112(f)
of the Patent Act, which allows a patent claim limitation to be drafted as a
“means . . . for performing a speciﬁed function” without reciting structure to
perform that function.358 The scope of a limitation drafted in that format is,
under the statute, limited to the structures described in the patent’s speciﬁca
tion.359 If the speciﬁcation does not disclose structure for performing the
claimed function, then the patent claim is invalid as indeﬁnite.360 The Federal
Circuit had previously made it difﬁcult to invalidate a patent under that doc
trine, holding that if a claim did not expressly use the term “means” there was a
353. 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996).
354. See Meurer, supra note 235, at 534–35.
355. 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2124 (2014). Under the Federal Circuit’s abrogated rule, a patent claim was
invalid only if it was “insolubly ambiguous.” Id. The Supreme Court, by contrast, held that “a patent is
invalid for indeﬁniteness if its claims, read in light of the speciﬁcation . . . and the prosecution history,
fail to inform, with reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention.” Id.
356. That said, many district courts, with the Federal Circuit’s blessing, allow juries to decide
indeﬁniteness, so the increase in speed is not entirely certain. See, e.g., Koninklijke Philips N.V. v. Zoll
Med. Corp., 656 F. App’x 504, 527–28 & n.5 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (vacating jury verdict of no indeﬁnite
ness because the jury instruction was based on pre-Nautilus law and remanding for another jury trial).
The confusion surrounding the allocation of decision-making authority on indeﬁniteness is well
illustrated by a recent Federal Circuit decision emphasizing that, because indeﬁniteness is a matter of
claim construction, it reviews the district court’s decision de novo (as if it were a question of law), but
also noting that the accused infringer must prove indeﬁniteness by clear and convincing evidence (a
heightened standard of proof that would normally apply only to a question of fact). Sonix Tech. Co. v.
Pubs. Int’l, Ltd., 844 F.3d 1370, 1376–77 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
357. 792 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc in relevant part).
358. 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) (2012).
359. Id.
360. Noah Sys., Inc. v. Intuit Inc., 675 F.3d 1302, 1311–12 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
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“strong” presumption that section 112(f) did not apply and, therefore, no
disclosure of structure was required.361 In Williamson, the court overturned that
case law, ruling that, to determine if section 112(f) applies, the court should
simply ask “whether the words of the claim are understood by persons of
ordinary skill in the art to have a sufﬁciently deﬁnite meaning as the name for
structure.”362
The decision to apply section 112(f) and whether to invalidate a patent under
that provision are both questions of claim construction for the judge.363 Thus,
Williamson’s embrace of a broader applicability of section 112(f) should, like
many other developments discussed in this Article, make it easier to invalidate
patents early in a case.364 That said, as I have argued elsewhere, most patent
claims that contain functional language also contain limitations that a court
could plausibly identify as structure to avoid applying section 112(f).365 At
most, then, Williamson offers courts discretion to invoke section 112(f) as a
mechanism for a quick decision.
A ﬁnal development related to claim construction that facilitates quicker
decisions is the demise of the doctrine of equivalents.366 The doctrine of
equivalents permits the factﬁnder to expand the literal scope of the patent to ﬁnd
infringement by products or processes that are “insubstantially different” from
the claimed invention.367 Since Markman, however, infringement claims under
the doctrine of equivalents have increasingly failed.368 Although commentators
disagree in the particulars about why that is so, they generally acknowledge that
Markman played a key role by making judicial claim construction the center
piece of patent litigation.369 Because the judge now determines the scope of the
patent before trial, the judge is unlikely to allow the jury to effectively nullify

361. Lighting World, Inc. v. Birchwood Lighting, Inc., 382 F.3d 1354, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
362. Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1348–49.
363. Id. at 1346.
364. See, e.g., Media Rights Techs., Inc. v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 800 F.3d 1366, 1368–71 (Fed.
Cir. 2015) (invalidating a patent under Williamson on a motion for judgment on the pleadings ﬁled at
the same time as the defendant’s opening claim construction brief).
365. Paul R. Gugliuzza, Early Filing and Functional Claiming, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1223, 1239–41
(2016).
366. See Meurer, supra note 235, at 535.
367. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997) (holding that “the
doctrine of equivalents must be applied to individual elements of the [patent] claim, not to the invention
as a whole”).
368. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The (Unnoticed) Demise of the Doctrine of Equivalents, 59
STAN. L. REV. 955, 978 (2007) (reporting that, in the three years before Markman was decided in 1996,
patentees won 40% of doctrine of equivalents cases compared with 24% for various periods from 1999
through 2005).
369. See id.; Lee Petherbridge, On the Decline of the Doctrine of Equivalents, 31 CARDOZO L. REV.
1371, 1401–02 (2010) (noting that substantive changes also made it more difﬁcult to establish
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents); David L. Schwartz, Explaining the Demise of the
Doctrine of Equivalents, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1157, 1160 (2011) (also highlighting the role of the
Federal Circuit’s decision in Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc., 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en
banc), which adopted a de novo standard of review for claim construction).
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the claim construction ruling by ﬁnding infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents.
Although Markman and its progeny have certainly facilitated quick decisions
that can end patent cases, the overall cost savings of those developments are not
beyond dispute. By putting claim construction in the hands of the judge,
Markman requires the parties to devote substantial resources to litigating claim
meaning before or concurrent with summary judgment. On that view, Markman
may have simply shifted litigation over claim meaning (and its attendant costs)
to an earlier stage of the case.370 Moreover, some observers have suggested that
the rules of judicial claim construction developed by the Federal Circuit in the
wake of Markman, which divorce the scope of patent rights from the patentee’s
actual invention, contributed to the rise of trolls, which has arguably increased
patent litigation overall.371 But even if the broader consequences of Markman
are not entirely clear, the decision has unquestionably allowed the often
dispositive issue of claim meaning to be resolved earlier in any given case.
2. Local Patent Rules
In recent years, numerous federal district courts have adopted local proce
dural rules, often for the express purpose of speeding up historically slowmoving patent litigation.372 In 2000, the Northern District of California became
the ﬁrst district to adopt local patent rules. Thirty districts now have them, and
they cover all aspects of pre-trial procedure, including the timing and sequence
of discovery,373 the process of claim construction,374 and even, in one district,
pleading requirements.375
Many features of local patent rules facilitate quick decisions, or at least quick
resolutions. For example, some districts’ rules (along with individual judges’
standing orders) impose early deadlines for document production376 and for the

370. Cf. Ashtor, supra note 178, at 219–20 (ﬁnding, from 2004 to 2011, a “signiﬁcant increase” in
patent litigation complexity as measured by case duration and the number of docket entries, motions,
and orders, attributing the increase to the discovery and claim construction phases).
371. See Greg Reilly, Patent “Trolls” and Claim Construction, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1045, 1062
(2016).
372. For a thorough description and analysis of those rules, see Megan M. La Belle, The Local Rules
of Patent Procedure, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 63 (2015).
373. E.g., N.D. ILL. PAT. R. 2.1.
374. E.g., E.D. TEX. PAT. R. 4-2 to 4-6.
375. D.N.H. PAT. R. 2.1(a) (requiring a complaint for patent infringement to include “a list of all
products or processes (by model number, trade name, or other speciﬁc identifying characteristic) for
which the claimant . . . has developed a good-faith basis for alleging infringement, as of the time of
ﬁling the pleading” and “at least one illustrative asserted patent claim (per asserted patent) for each
accused product or process”).
376. See La Belle, supra note 372, at 100; see also Eastern District of Texas, Sample Discovery
Order for Patent Cases Assigned to Judge Rodney Gilstrap and Judge Roy Payne 2–3, http://www.txed.
uscourts.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/judgeFiles/Discovery_Order_for_Patent_Cases_%282016-11-04%29_0.
docx [https://perma.cc/5MFV-79PQ] (requiring the parties to produce all documents “that are relevant
to the pleaded claims or defenses involved in this action” with their initial disclosures “[w]ithout
awaiting a discovery request”).
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parties to exchange infringement and validity contentions.377 Those deadlines,
coupled with Markman’s recasting of claim construction as a question for the
judge, help speed cases toward claim construction and summary judgment.
Compelled information exchange about the merits of the case is also thought to
facilitate settlement,378 building on the mandatory initial disclosures introduced
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the 1990s.379 In addition, many local
rules mandate settlement conferences—sometimes more than one—often in
front of a magistrate judge,380 which can also lead to quicker resolution of the
case. And some local rules complement early deadlines for disclosure by
providing speciﬁc, relatively quick trial dates.381
In the District of Delaware, which does not have local patent rules but in
2016 heard the second most patent cases of any district, the judges have
individually adopted numerous procedures designed to resolve cases more
quickly. Many of those procedures were inspired by the district’s “Patent Study
Group,” which recommended that judges “help identify weaker cases and end
them early,” set a trial date “at the beginning of the case and keep it,” and
“issu[e] decisions,” particularly claim construction decisions, “quickly.”382 The
procedures include: setting an initial case management conference as soon as
any defendant ﬁles an answer (as opposed to waiting until any motions to
dismiss are resolved),383 providing for early Markman hearings on case disposi
tive claim terms,384 indicating a willingness to limit the number of claims
asserted,385 and setting a trial date in the initial case scheduling order.386

377. See Travis Jensen, Infringement Contentions Summary Chart, LOCAL PAT. RULES, http://www.
localpatentrules.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Chart%20Infringement%20Contentions.pdf [https://
perma.cc/69NT-SVY5].
378. See Robert G. Bone, Discovery, in PROCEDURAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 188, 192 (Chris William
Sanchirico ed., 2012).
379. 8A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2053 (3d ed. 2017).
380. See, e.g., D. NEV. LOCAL PAT. R. 1-19 (requiring settlement conferences to take place (1) before
claim construction, (2) after claim construction, and (3) before trial).
381. See, e.g., S.D. OHIO PAT. R. 107.1 (setting the trial date at eighteen months after the initial
scheduling conference).
382. Chad Stover, Another Delaware Judge Outlines New Patent Case Practices, LAW360 (May 19,
2014, 6:43 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/539183/another-delaware-judge-outlines-new-patent
case-practices [https://perma.cc/6NCV-QM74].
383. Hon. Leonard P. Stark, District of Delaware, Revised Procedures for Managing Patent Cases 5
(June 18, 2014), http://www.ded.uscourts.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/Chambers/LPS/PatentProcs/LPS-Patent
Procedures.pdf [https://perma.cc/QY8Q-KD7V].
384. Id. at 8.
385. E.g., Hon. Sue L. Robinson, District of Delaware, Patent Case Scheduling Order 4–5 (Feb. 5,
2015), http://www.ded.uscourts.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/Chambers/SLR/Forms/Sched-Order-Patent2-05
15.pdf [https://perma.cc/6L27-QLYG].
386. E.g., Hon. Gregory M. Sleet, District of Delaware, Patent Scheduling Order 5 (Feb. 25, 2014),
http://www.ded.uscourts.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/Chambers/GMS/Forms/Sched_Order_Patent_Rev02-25
14.pdf [https://perma.cc/23MU-N87K].
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Although local rules and individual judges’ practices (sometimes termed
“local-local rules”387) facilitate quicker decisions, those decisions are, like an
early claim construction order that leads to summary judgment, not necessarily
cheap. Early disclosure deadlines, for instance, require the parties to undertake
signiﬁcant discovery efforts at a time when a motion to dismiss may be under
consideration or the defendant may be preparing a petition for inter partes
review and seeking a stay of the litigation.388 Accordingly, proposals have
percolated in Congress that would require courts to stay discovery until prelimi
nary motions are resolved389 or until the judge issues the claim construction
order.390 Those proposals would reduce litigation in some cases but prolong
proceedings in many others. Some observers have suggested that litigation
delays are less harmful to patentees today because patentees who win infringe
ment suits are no longer presumptively entitled to injunctive relief.391 A paten
tee who must wait an additional year to receive damages, the thinking goes, is
not harmed nearly as much as a patentee who must endure an additional year of
competition from an infringing competitor.392 But nearly 75% of successful
patentees still obtain permanent injunctions, and that ﬁgure increases to 80%
when patentees who do not practice their patents are excluded.393 A potentially
more nuanced alternative to automatically staying discovery would be for
district judges to more generously exercise the discretion they already have to
pause proceedings when there is a preliminary motion pending that will substan
tially impact, if not resolve, the case.394
3. Declaratory Judgments
Although most of the examples of legal changes that facilitate quick deci
sions end litigation earlier, recent Supreme Court and Federal Circuit decisions
about declaratory judgments make it possible for disputes to get into court more
quickly. By statute, the federal courts may hear declaratory judgment claims
only when there is an “actual controversy” between the parties.395 For many
years, the Federal Circuit held that an actual controversy existed only when the
potential infringer had a reasonable apprehension it was about to be sued for
387. See La Belle, supra note 372, at 66 (quoting Paul D. Carrington, Renovating Discovery, 49
ALA. L. REV. 51, 56 (1997)).
388. See Love & Yoon, supra note 197, at 23.
389. See, e.g., Innovation Act, H.R. 9, § 3(d)(1), 114th Cong. (2015).
390. See, e.g., Innovation Act, H.R. 3309, § 3(d)(1), 113th Cong. (2013).
391. See Lichtman, supra note 190, at 438–39 (discussing the impact of the Supreme Court’s
decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006)).
392. See id. at 445–46. Indeed, prejudgment interest can compensate for any delay in awarding
damages. See id. at 439–40.
393. Christopher B. Seaman, Permanent Injunctions in Patent Litigation After eBay: An Empirical
Study, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1949, 1983, 1988 (2016).
394. See Paul R. Gugliuzza, Patent Trolls and Patent Litigation Reform, in OXFORD HANDBOOKS
ONLINE, at 11–12 (2017), http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199935352.00
1.0001/oxfordhb-9780199935352-e-15?print=pdf [https://perma.cc/WP5B-J444].
395. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2012).
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infringement.396 But the Supreme Court, in its 2007 decision in MedImmune,
Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., rejected that restrictive test and adopted a more ﬂexible
standard that looks at “all the circumstances” to determine whether there is a
sufﬁciently concrete dispute to warrant a declaratory judgment.397
This new standard allows potential infringers to seek a declaratory judgment
earlier—before the dispute has escalated to threats of litigation. For instance, in
the Federal Circuit’s leading case applying MedImmune, the patentee had
explicitly stated that it did not intend to ﬁle suit.398 Yet the court held that an
oral presentation and written analysis alleging infringement, during the course
of licensing negotiations, were sufﬁcient to create the required controversy.399
In a later case, the court made clear that a party may ﬁle a declaratory judgment
suit even when the patentee has not “afﬁrmatively accused” it of infringe
ment.400 And, in one recent case, the Federal Circuit held that an actual
controversy existed even though the patentee never referenced—and, indeed,
did not know about—the speciﬁc products that were potentially infringing.401
These decisions lowering the bar for standing make it easier for potential
infringers to get into court.402 But the effects on litigation costs are complex
because relaxing the standing requirement probably encourages more litigation.
For example, a patentee who wants to choose the forum might simply sue for
infringement rather than writing a letter that could trigger the accused infringer
to ﬁle a declaratory judgment action in an unfavorable venue. Moreover, there
are probably cases on the margins where, but for the recent relaxation of the
standing requirement, there might have been no litigation at all because the
parties would have negotiated a settlement. Thus, although changes to the law
of declaratory judgment standing facilitate quicker decisions on validity, the
effects on overall costs are complex, as with most other mechanisms of quick
decisions discussed in this Article.
4. Additional Mechanisms of Quick Decisions
Although many other legal developments have facilitated speedy decisions in
patent cases, I hope by now to have made the basic point. For the sake of
completeness, I will conclude with three ﬁnal examples that warrant at least
brief mention.
The ﬁrst involves proceedings at the U.S. International Trade Commission
(ITC). Under section 337 of the Tariff Act, the ITC has the power to issue

396. See, e.g., Gen–Probe Inc. v. Vysis, Inc., 359 F.3d 1376, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
397. 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
398. SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
399. Id. at 1382.
400. Danisco U.S. Inc. v. Novozymes A/S, 744 F.3d 1325, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
401. Asia Vital Components Co. v. Asetek Danmark A/S, 837 F.3d 1249, 1254 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
402. For an argument that, even after MedImmune, the Federal Circuit has continued to make it too
difﬁcult for certain litigants to challenge patents, see Gaia Bernstein, The End User’s Predicament:
User Standing in Patent Litigation, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1929, 1937–38 (2016).
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exclusion orders that prohibit importing goods that infringe a U.S. patent.403
ITC proceedings move quickly compared to patent litigation in court, conclud
ing in about seventeen months on average.404 Also, unlike litigation in court,
ITC proceedings are not stayed for PTAB proceedings. The ITC’s speed is
attractive to patentees. It has contributed to the growth of the Commission’s
patent caseload from about ten cases per year in the late 1990s to roughly ﬁfty
cases per year today.405
Second, as mentioned above, the Supreme Court’s decision in KSR made
clear that obviousness, though a fact-intensive question, can be amenable to
summary judgment.406 Before KSR, the Federal Circuit had held that its “teach
ing, suggestion, or motivation” test was a question of fact, meaning that the
crucial issue of obviousness frequently “could not be decided without a multimil
lion dollar jury trial.”407 In KSR, the Court stated that many of the key inquiries
in the obviousness analysis are to be made by the “court,” hinting at a reduced
role for the jury in obviousness disputes.408 Empirical evidence suggests that,
since KSR, the Federal Circuit has been more deferential to district court
summary judgment rulings of obviousness than it was before the Supreme
Court’s decision,409 suggesting that the judge—not a jury—is more commonly
being allowed to have the ﬁnal word on the issue.
403. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2012).
404. See Kumar, supra note 203, at 536–37. Before 1994, section 337 imposed ﬁxed time limits that
required proceedings to conclude within one year, or eighteen months in more complicated cases, 19
U.S.C. § 1337(b)(1) (1988), but those time limits were found to violate the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade. See Joel W. Rogers & Joseph P. Whitlock, Is Section 337 Consistent with the GATT
and the TRIPs Agreement?, 17 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 459, 475–81 (2002).
405. U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, NUMBER OF SECTION 337 INVESTIGATIONS INSTITUTED BY CALENDAR
YEAR, http://www.usitc.gov/intellectual_property/documents/cy_337_institutions.pdf [https://perma.cc/S
88T-QYJ4]; U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, SECTION 337 STATISTICS: NUMBER OF NEW, COMPLETED, AND
ACTIVE INVESTIGATIONS BY FISCAL YEAR, https://www.usitc.gov/intellectual_property/337_statistics_
number_new_completed_and_active.htm [https://perma.cc/MT49-FC95] (last updated July 14, 2017).
To be sure, some of that growth is also due to the Supreme Court’s 2006 decision in eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006), which made it more difﬁcult for plaintiffs who do not
practice their patent to obtain an injunction in federal court. See Seaman, supra note 393, at 1952.
Although the ITC cannot award damages for infringement, it enters an exclusion order—effectively, an
injunction against future infringement if the infringing product is imported from abroad—in practically
every case in which the patentee prevails. See Colleen V. Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdup, the
ITC, and the Public Interest, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 16 (2012).
406. See, e.g., Wyers v. Master Lock Co., 616 F.3d 1231, 1239–40 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (post-KSR decision
emphasizing that the question of motivation to combine, a factual determination underpinning the obviousness
analysis, can be appropriate for resolution on summary judgment, particularly when “the existence of a
motivation to combine references . . . boil[s] down to a question of ‘common sense’”).
407. John F. Duffy, KSR v. Teleﬂex: Predictable Reform of Patent Substance and Procedure in the
Judiciary, 106 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 34, 36–37 (2007).
408. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleﬂex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417–18 (2007) (“[A] court must ask whether the
improvement is more than the predictable use of prior art elements according to their established
functions[;] . . . a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary
skill in the art would employ.” (emphasis added)).
409. See Jason Rantanen, The Federal Circuit’s New Obviousness Jurisprudence: An Empirical
Study, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 709, 745 tbl.5 (2013) (reporting a post-KSR afﬁrmance rate of 80%,
compared to a 56% afﬁrmance rate in the ten years before the Court granted review).
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Finally, Congress in the past few decades has created two sui generis regimes
designed to encourage the expeditious assertion and resolution of patent litiga
tion in the pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical industries. In 1984, Congress
passed the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act,410 com
monly known as the Hatch–Waxman Act, which allows the prospective distribu
tor of a generic pharmaceutical product to engage in an “artiﬁcial” act of
infringement by sending a written notice (often called a “paragraph IV certiﬁca
tion,” in reference to the applicable subsection of the Act) to the patentee
asserting that its patent is invalid, unenforceable, or not infringed. The para
graph IV certiﬁcation gives the patentee forty-ﬁve days to ﬁle an infringement
suit or else the generic company may enter the market.411 To encourage generic
companies to challenge patents, the Act grants 180 days of market exclusivity to
the ﬁrst generic company to ﬁle a paragraph IV certiﬁcation.412
The Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act (BPCIA) of 2009413
created a broadly similar regime for expediting resolution of patent disputes
related to biological drugs.414 In a recent decision, the Supreme Court further
facilitated quick resolution of disputes under the BPCIA by holding that the
biosimilar applicant may provide the patentee with the notice that can trigger an
infringement suit before the Food and Drug Administration approves the biosimi
lar product.415 (The Federal Circuit had previously held that the notice could be
provided only after agency approval.416) Thus, both the Hatch–Waxman Act and
the BPCIA share a purpose consistent with the general trend toward quick
resolution of patent infringement claims.417
IV. QUICK DECISIONS IN THE FUTURE
As the discussion above demonstrates, many recent developments in patent
law can be understood as providing mechanisms to increase speed to decision.
Those changes have the potential to signiﬁcantly improve the patent system.
AIA proceedings and motions to dismiss on eligibility grounds, for example,
provide new mechanisms for resolving infringement disputes before discovery,
410. Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984).
411. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2012).
412. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv). Whether that provision has, in fact, incentivized successful patent
challenges is a matter of some debate. See C. Scott Hemphill & Mark A. Lemley, Earning Exclusivity:
Generic Drug Incentives and the Hatch–Waxman Act, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 947, 953–55 (2011).
413. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 804.
414. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(C) (2012).
415. Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1664, 1677 (2017).
416. Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 794 F.3d 1347, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
417. See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2228 (2013) (noting that “[t]he Hatch–Waxman
process . . . ‘speed[s] the introduction of low-cost generic drugs to market’” and that the paragraph IV
certiﬁcation “often ‘means provoking litigation’” (quoting Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk
A/S, 566 U.S. 399, 406 (2012) (second alteration in original)); Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Petitioner/Cross-Respondent 3, Sandoz, 137 S. Ct. 1664, 2017 WL 2507337 (“The
BPCIA facilitates early resolution of patent claims by establishing a so-called ‘artiﬁcial’ patentinfringement claim . . . .”).
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something that is particularly useful in deterring low-merit litigation. Yet the
overall cost savings of this trend is not beyond doubt. Quick decisions may
result in erroneous patent invalidations and may incentivize litigation about
issues, such as pleading sufﬁciency, that were not previously disputed. More
over, although many of the recent changes allow defendants to avoid liability
for infringement, they offer little help to patentees seeking quick adjudication of
meritorious claims. One might therefore be tempted to dismiss the trend toward
quick decisions as simply part of an emerging shift to an era of weaker patent
rights.418 Yet viewing patent law through the lens of speed to decision can teach
lessons that transcend the pro-patent/anti-patent divide.
A. MERELY AN ANTI-PATENT MOMENT?

Without a doubt, many mechanisms of quick decisions favor accused infring
ers. Only an infringer can win a case through a motion to dismiss on eligibility
grounds. Markman’s separation of claim construction from trial creates an
additional stage at which a defendant can prevail.419 KSR’s invigoration of the
nonobviousness requirement favors accused infringers, too.
But the pro- or anti-patent valence of the trend toward quick decisions is
arguably more nuanced. Although it is too early to draw ﬁrm conclusions, the
grant rate of motions to dismiss on eligibility grounds seems to be falling,
perhaps providing a preliminary indication that those invalidations are increas
ingly conﬁned to the weakest patents or that very weak patents are no longer
being asserted in litigation. As for the supposedly deadly AIA proceedings,
recall that the PTAB institutes review of fewer than half of all challenged patent
claims, and it invalidates only about a quarter of challenged claims.420
The speed engendered by local patent rules can favor patentees by coercing
the defendant to settle rather than risk an uncertain outcome before a jury.421 A
quick settlement or a speedy trial or can “allow a patentee to build a war chest
to sue other defendants, and, in the case of trial, build the reputation of the
patent.”422 Indeed, the Eastern District of Texas became the favorite venue for

418. On the tendency of patent law to cycle between pro-patent and anti-patent eras, see Mark A.
Lemley, The Surprising Resilience of the Patent System, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1, 13–14 (2016). The prior,
pro-patent era commenced in the early 1980s and was itself a response to the era of weak patent rights
that spanned the 1960s and 1970s. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in
Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 6–7 (1989).
419. Mark A. Lemley, The Fractioning of Patent Law 504, 506, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE
COMMON LAW (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., 2013).
420. See PTAB STATISTICS, supra note 89, at 12–13; Dreyfuss, supra note 18, at 252–58 (challenging
the argument that invalidity rates at the PTAB are too high); cf. Gregory Dolin, Dubious Patent Reform,
56 B.C. L. REV. 881, 926–31 (2015) (raising concerns about high invalidity rates in AIA proceedings,
but also noting the limitations of the available data).
421. See J. Jonas Anderson, Court Competition for Patent Cases, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 631, 677
(2015).
422. Mark A. Lemley, Where to File Your Patent Case, 38 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 13 (2010); see also Silicon
Valley: The Patent Troll (HBO television broadcast June 4, 2017). In the show, Pied Piper, the startup
run by the show’s protagonist, Richard Hendricks, was targeted by a patent troll shortly after Pied
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patentees not because its substantive rulings were particularly pro-patentee, but
because of procedural doctrines and practices that enhanced patentees’ bargain
ing power in settlement negotiations.423 The fast proceedings and the nearly
automatic exclusion orders available at the ITC also favor patentees.424
In addition, the Supreme Court’s recent patent decisions have neither uni
formly facilitated quick decisions nor uniformly favored accused infringers. A
notable example favoring patentees and potentially extending the duration of
litigation is the Court’s 2016 decision in Halo Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse Electron
ics, Inc., which made it easier for a patentee to recover enhanced damages for
willful infringement.425 The Court also removed from the enhanced damages
analysis a threshold question of law about the objective merits of the defen
dant’s case that had previously been determined by the judge, typically on
summary judgment. Instead, the Court held that the decision to award enhanced
damages is ultimately a matter of the district court’s discretion.426 Conse
quently, the issue of willfulness will likely get past summary judgment and go
to the jury more frequently.427 If the jury ﬁnds willfulness, then the judge has
the power to make the ultimate, discretionary decision about whether to award
enhanced damages.428 In several recent decisions, including in Halo itself on
remand, judges have declined to award enhanced damages despite a jury ﬁnding
of willfulness.429 A more efﬁcient process—and one that is arguably consistent
with the Supreme Court’s opinion in Halo—would put the power to award
enhanced damages entirely in the hands of the judge.430

Piper’s data compression application appeared on a list of the 500 most downloaded apps on the Hooli
app store (counting utility apps only, in subgroup mobile and subgroup storage—a feat that, as Pied
Piper’s head of business development noted with perhaps a little too much satisfaction, put the
company’s app “ﬁrmly” in the top 30,000 overall). When asked about the troll, Hendricks’s lawyer
explained that the patentee in question “starts at the bottom of those lists and works his way up; the
more settlements he gets the stronger his case; the higher you are on the list, the more money he asks
for.”
423. See Daniel Klerman & Greg Reilly, Forum Selling, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 241, 250 (2016).
424. See supra note 405.
425. 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016).
426. To guide that discretion, the Court noted that “[t]he sort of conduct warranting enhanced
damages has been variously described in our cases as willful, wanton, malicious, bad-faith, deliberate,
consciously wrongful, ﬂagrant, or—indeed—characteristic of a pirate.” Id. at 1932. On the standard for
awarding enhanced damages after Halo, see generally Dmitry Karshtedt, Enhancing Patent Damages,
51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2945696 [https://perma.cc/9WSR
TQB5].
427. See, e.g., Erﬁndergemeinschaft UroPep GbR v. Eli Lilly & Co., 240 F. Supp. 3d 605, 618 (E.D.
Tex. 2017) (Bryson, J., sitting by designation) (denying motion for summary judgment of no willfulness
despite objective evidence favorable to the defendant, criticizing the defendant for “offer[ing] no . . . sum
mary judgment evidence going to the subjective beliefs of its decisionmakers”), appeal ﬁled, No.
2017-2603 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 25, 2017).
428. See Karshtedt, supra note 426, at 67.
429. See id. at 71 n.577 (citing, among other cases, Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., No.
2:07-cv-00331, 2017 WL 3896672, at *16 (D. Nev. Sept. 6, 2017)).
430. See Michael Feldman & Mark A. Lemley, “Characteristic of a Pirate”: Willfulness and Treble
Damages 3 (Stanford Public Law, Working Paper No. 2811773, 2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=28117
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The Supreme Court’s recent decision in TC Heartland is more consistent
with a general trend of favoring accused infringers, giving them hope of
avoiding litigation in the patentee-friendly Eastern District of Texas.431 But the
decision will likely result in protracted pre-merits litigation and increase litiga
tion costs. Previously, the venue rule in patent cases was, whatever its virtues or
vices, quite clear: venue was proper in any district in which the defendant was
subject to personal jurisdiction, which, for many corporations doing business
nationwide, was any district in the country.432 Under TC Heartland, however,
venue is proper only in the defendant’s place of incorporation or in any district
“where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and
established place of business.”433 Although the Federal Circuit has recently
begun to elaborate on what it means for a defendant to have a regular and
established place of business in a particular district,434 the paucity of appellate
case law on that fact-speciﬁc question means that it will likely take time—and
litigation—for courts to bring some predictability to the issue.435 The factspeciﬁc nature of the venue question has already been used to justify wideranging early-stage discovery into the defendant’s business activities in the
forum.436
Moreover, even after TC Heartland, accused infringers will continue to ﬁle
motions to transfer venue for convenience purposes under 28 U.S.C. sec
tion 1404(a), particularly in cases that are ﬁled in the accused infringer’s place
of incorporation but that bear no other connection to the district.437 In other
words, after TC Heartland, defendants have not one but two mechanisms for
challenging venue. First, they can argue that venue is improper because they are
not incorporated in the plaintiff’s chosen district, have not committed acts of
infringement there, and do not have a regular and established place of business
there. Second, even if venue is proper, defendants can still seek transfer for
convenience reasons under section 1404(a). Indeed, in many cases, defendants
will be able to raise both of those arguments at the outset of the case, further

73 [https://perma.cc/DW7A-QTC3] (suggesting that, because the Supreme Court in Halo adopted an
“abuse of discretion” standard of review, “the power to impose [enhanced] damages may now lie
exclusively with the judge” (emphasis added)).
431. TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017).
432. See Gugliuzza & La Belle, supra note 17, at 1042–44.
433. 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (2012).
434. In re Cray Inc., 871 F.3d 1355, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
435. See id. (“In deciding whether a defendant has a regular and established place of business in a
district, no precise rule has been laid down and each case depends on its own facts.”).
436. See, e.g., Nike, Inc. v. Skechers U.S.A., Inc., No. 3:16-cv-007, 2017 WL 3389022, at *2 (D. Or.
June 30, 2017) (granting a motion to compel discovery on, among other things, the defendant’s sales in
the district, the activities of its third-party vendors and its relationships with those vendors, “the
activities of [the defendant’s] agents, whether the agent is based in [the district] or not,” and the
property owned or leased by the defendant in the district).
437. See generally Paul R. Gugliuzza, The New Federal Circuit Mandamus, 45 IND. L. REV. 343,
383–90 (2012) (discussing the use of section 1404(a) motions in patent litigation).
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slowing down the initial stages of the litigation.438
Thus, though many recent developments in patent law facilitate quick deci
sions in favor of accused infringers, other developments may drag out litigation,
increase costs, and, more rarely, favor patentees.
B. WHAT CAN WE LEARN?

Thinking about patent disputes in terms of speed to decision provides a useful
way to evaluate recent changes to the substance of patent law because it
provides an analytical vocabulary that transcends the usual pro-patent/anti
patent divide. For instance, I showed above how some aspects of current
eligibility doctrine are substantively problematic. The test for determining
eligibility is vague and results can be unpredictable. As I also highlighted,
however, a comprehensive critique of that doctrine must acknowledge the
savings in litigation costs that stems from allowing courts to resolve validity on
the pleadings. Going forward, one potential reform, which I explore in more
detail in a forthcoming article,439 would be for courts to more clearly articulate
the distinction between questions of law and questions of fact in the eligibility
analysis. That clearer distinction would ensure that fact-driven questions of
patentability are not resolved prematurely (and potentially erroneously) on an
inadequate record, but still preserve the eligibility requirement as a mechanism
to quickly invalidate patents for which there is no plausible case for patentability.
In a similar vein, the new AIA proceedings, even if they are not perfectly
accurate, have invalidated many patents that almost certainly did not comply
with the requirements of the Patent Act. Yet the social beneﬁt from clearing
invalid patents is undermined by the costs of permitting the validity of a single
patent to be reviewed by both the courts and the PTO. I discussed above various
reforms that could help reduce the costs of concurrent proceedings, such as
enhancing preclusive effects between the PTO and the courts and strengthening
the rules of estoppel that foreclose certain arguments from being pursued in a
subsequent proceeding.440
Likewise, the deletion of the form complaint for patent infringement from the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure has been praised as offering defendants
protection from frivolous claims of infringement. But that change may have
simply increased litigation about the sufﬁciency of pleadings with minimal
corresponding beneﬁt in terms of dispositive dismissals of weak claims. One
improvement in that area would be for the Federal Circuit to provide more
guidance about what, precisely, a patentee needs to include in its complaint to

438. See, e.g., Free-Flow Packaging Int’l Inc. v. Automated Packaging Sys., Inc., No. CV-17-6398,
slip op. at 4, 9 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2017) (granting a motion to transfer to the Northern District of Ohio
under section 1404(a) after the case had already been dismissed in the Northern District of California
for improper venue and reﬁled in the Central District of California, where the defendant maintained a
sales ofﬁce (and hence had a “regular and established place of business”)).
439. See Gugliuzza, supra note 308.
440. See supra Section III.A.1.
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avoid a motion to dismiss for failing to sufﬁciently allege direct infringement.441
Finally, because the mechanisms of quick decisions that currently exist tend
to favor accused infringers, we might consider adopting measures to facilitate
quicker adjudication when a patentee has a clearly meritorious claim for
infringement.442 The accused infringer’s Seventh Amendment jury trial right,
however, presents a signiﬁcant obstacle to such a reform.443 Absent dramatic
changes to the relevant constitutional law, patentees may, unfortunately, have to
be content with more modest reforms, such as local patent rules and greater
clarity in pleading standards and eligibility law, that move meritorious cases
toward trial more quickly.
As I have discussed throughout this Article, the interaction between speed to
decision, litigation costs, and decisional accuracy is complex. Understanding the
enforcement-related complications that ﬂow from changes in patent law can help the
patent system strike a better balance between the ideal of patents as an incentive for
innovation and the reality that bad patents and weak claims for infringement exist and
should be amenable to quick disposition. Much of the current debate on the state of
the patent system ﬁxates on the seemingly unanswerable question of whether strong
patents or weak patents are better for innovation.444 Considerations of decisional
speed and enforcement costs provide a more neutral language for discussing patent
law’s ongoing evolution. Discussing potential law reforms in those more neutral terms
could help modulate the often-dramatic swings in substantive patent law between proand anti-patent eras.
CONCLUSION
With a few exceptions, the trend in patent litigation, as in many areas of civil
litigation, is toward quicker resolution. Generally speaking, this trend is a reasonable
response to concerns that the PTO has issued too many patents that are invalid and
that patentees can too easily use those patents to obtain unwarranted settlement
payments. But not all quick decisions are cheap, and quick decisions may increase the
risk of error. Recognizing the interplay between speed, cost, and accuracy is essential
to any normative analysis of recent developments in patent law.

441. See supra notes 344–47 and accompanying text.
442. For a sketch of a regime that would permit accelerated ﬁnal adjudication in favor of both
plaintiffs and defendants, see Zuckerman, supra note 130, at 379–81 (drawing on the current system of
preliminary injunction practice).
443. Even if the Supreme Court were to rule that there is no Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial
on the issue of patent validity, see supra notes 227–28 and accompanying text (discussing the Oil States
case, which potentially presents that issue to the Supreme Court); see also Lemley, supra note 125, at
1720 (raising doubts about whether a jury trial right exists on the issue of validity), the right to a jury
trial on the issue of infringement is well-established. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517
U.S. 370, 377 (1996) (“[T]here is no dispute that infringement cases today must be tried before a jury,
as their predecessors were more than two centuries ago.”).
444. Cf. Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Patent Experimentalism, 101 VA. L. REV. 65, 76–87 (2015)
(summarizing the uncertainty over whether patents actually promote innovation and arguing that
variations in patent policy across jurisdictions could help reduce that uncertainty).

